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SB 905 (Archuleta) – Criminal history information requests 
 
Under existing law, specified people whose job or volunteer position includes authority over 
children are required to get a criminal background check. Such a background check may require 
a person submit their home address along with their fingerprints. Some organizations have found 
that while people are happy to volunteer they are not comfortable submitting always 
conformable submitting private information to a governmental agency. This bill would provide 
that a residence address would not be required to be submitted to the DOJ in order to perform a 
background check.   
 
Federal law authorizes the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to exchange Criminal History 
Record Information (CHRI) with officials of state and local governmental agencies for licensing 
and employment purposes. This can only be authorized by a state statute which has been 
approved by the Attorney General of the United States. In order make such an approval, the 
Attorney General of the United States looks for specific language in the state statute. If the 
language is not present then the Attorney General will not approve the sharing of CHR. Over the 
years, this Legislature has enacted various background check laws that require federal criminal 
history information. While many state background check statutes contain the appropriate 
language for approval by the Attorney General of the United States, not all do.   
 
SB 905 (Archuleta) Chapter 191, provides that a residence address shall not be required to 
be submitted to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for a background check of an individual 
applying to work with a minor and makes a technical amendment to facilitate the processing 
of background checks. Specifically, this new law: 
 
• Provides that the DOJ shall not require the applicant’s residence address for any request 
for criminal records pertaining to a person applying for a license, employment, or 
volunteer position, in which he or she would have supervisory or disciplinary power 
over a minor or any person under his or her care. 
 
• Adds “universal citation” language into California law to clarify that all agencies and 
entities that are authorized to get background checks can also receive federal  









AB 1145 (Garcia, C.) – Child Abuse: reportable conduct 
 
The Child Abuse Neglect and Reporting Act (CANRA) was established in 1981 for the purpose 
of protecting children from abuse and neglect. The law imposes a mandatory reporting 
requirement on individuals whose professions bring them into contact with children.  Under 
CANRA, “child abuse” includes “sexual abuse,” and “sexual abuse” consists of “sexual assault” 
or “sexual exploitation.” The definition of sexual assault includes specific crimes involving 
sexual contact. 
 
In 2013, the Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA) evaluated the issue of whether CANRA 
requires practitioners to report all conduct by minors that fall under the definition of sodomy and 
oral copulation. Relying on case law and the legislative intent behind CANRA, DCA concluded 
that mandated reporters are not required to report consensual sex between minors of like age for 
any of the conduct listed as sexual assault unless the practitioner reasonably suspects that the 
conduct resulted from force, undue influence, coercion, or other indicators of child abuse.  
Because sexual conduct of minors that meet the definition of sodomy and oral copulation must 
be treated the same as all other conduct listed in the section (i.e. Penal Code Section 288), only 
instances involving acts that are nonconsensual, abusive or involves minors of disparate ages, 
conduct between minors and adults, and situations where there are indicators of abuse. (See 
DCA, Memorandum on the Evaluation of CANRA Reform Proposal Related to Reporting 
Consensual Sex Between Minors (Apr. 11, 2013).) 
 
AB 1145 (C. Garcia), Chapter 180, eliminates the requirement that mandated reporters 
under CANRA report specified consensual sexual conduct involving minors by redefining 
the scope of “sexual assault.” Specifically, this new law: 
 
• Specifies that “sexual assault” shall not include specified consensual sexual conduct for 
purposes of mandated reporting of child abuse under CANRA.   
 
• States that “sexual assault” for the purposes of CANRA does not include voluntary 
conduct for sodomy, oral copulation, or sexual penetration with a foreign object, if there 
are no indicators of abuse, unless the conduct is between a person 21 years of age or older 
and a minor who is under 16 years of age. 
 
 
AB 1963 (Chu) – Child abuse or neglect: mandated reporters 
 
Under existing law, the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (CANRA) requires a mandated 
reporter, as defined, to report, whenever they, in their professional capacity or within the scope 
of their employment, have knowledge of or observes a child whom the mandated reporter knows 
or reasonably suspects has been the victim of child abuse or neglect. Failure of a mandated 
reporter to report an incident of known or reasonably suspected child abuse or neglect is a 
misdemeanor punishable by up to six months in a county jail, by a fine not to exceed $1,000, or 
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by both that imprisonment and fine. 
 
AB 1963 (Chu), Chapter 243, makes a human resource employee of a business that 
employs five or more employees and, also, employs minors a mandated reporter of child 
abuse or neglect, and a person whose duties require direct contact with and supervision of 
minors in the performance of the minors duties in the workplace a mandated reporter of 
sexual abuse for the purpose of CANRA. 
 
 
AB 2741 (Rubio, B.) – Children’s advocacy centers 
 
Children’s Advocacy Centers (CAC’s) are at the forefront of the fight against the abuse and 
exploitation of vulnerable individuals. CAC’s are able to address a continuum of care for abused 
children with a wide breadth of personnel including law enforcement, child protection entities, 
and medical professionals. These services are a critical foundation to ensuring abused children 
receive the resources and protections they require. However, without a statutory definition of the 
services that must be provided at these centers, there can be confusion as to what services are 
available to the children and the families served by them. 
 
AB 2741 (Blanca Rubio), Chapter 353, authorizes counties to create CAC’s in order to 
implement coordinated multidisciplinary responses to child abuse. Specifically, this new 
law: 
 
• Authorizes counties to utilize a CAC in order to implement coordinated 
multidisciplinary responses to investigate reports involving child physical or sexual 
abuse, exploitation, or maltreatment. 
 
• Requires any county that utilizes a CAC to coordinate its multidisciplinary response 
to meet the following standards: 
 
o The multidisciplinary team associated with the CAC shall consist of a 
representative of the CAC and at least one representative from each of the 
following disciplines: law enforcement, child protective services, district 
attorney’s office, medical providers, mental health providers, victim advocate, 
or a representative of the CAC. Members of the multidisciplinary team may 
fill more than one role as needed;  
 
o The multidisciplinary team, as utilized through the CAC, shall have cultural 
competency and diversity training to meet the needs of the community it 
serves; 
 
o The CAC shall have a designated legal entity responsible for the governance 
of its operations. This entity shall oversee ongoing business practices of the 
CAC, including setting and implementing administrative policies, hiring and 
managing personnel, obtaining funding, supervising program and fiscal 
4 
 
operations, and long-term planning; 
 
o The CAC shall provide a dedicated child-focused setting designed to provide 
a safe, comfortable and neutral place where forensic interviews and other 
CAC services can be appropriately provided for children and families; 
 
o The CAC shall produce written protocols for case review and case review 
procedures. Additionally, the CAC shall use a case tracking system to provide 
information on essential demographics and case information; 
 
o The CAC shall verify that members of the multidisciplinary team responsible 
for medical evaluations have specific training in child abuse or child sexual 
abuse examinations;  
 
o The CAC shall verify that members of the multidisciplinary team responsible 
for mental health services are trained in, and deliver, trauma-focused, 
evidence supported, mental health treatments; and, 
 
o The CAC shall verify that interviews conducted in the course of investigations 
are conducted in a forensically sound manner and occur in a child-focused 
setting designed to provide a safe, comfortable and dedicated for children and 
families. 
 
• Provides that counties are not limited to utilizing only one CAC.  
 
• States that the files, reports, records, communications, and working papers used or 
developed in providing services through a CAC are confidential and not public 
records. 
 
• Authorizes a multidisciplinary team at a CAC to share with other multidisciplinary 
team members any information or records concerning the child and family and the 
person who is the subject of the investigation of suspected child abuse or neglect for 
the sole purpose of facilitating a forensic interview or case discussion or providing 
services to the child or family; provided, however, that the shared information or 
records shall be treated as privileged and confidential to the extent required by law by 









AB 732 (Bonta) – County jails:  prisons:  incarcerated pregnant persons 
 
Existing law requires the Board of State and Community Corrections to establish minimum 
standards for state and local correctional facilities. The standards include specific ones for 
pregnant incarcerated persons. (Pen. Code, § 6030.) A 2016 report by the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) of California noted that “protections that address obstetric care, housing 
accommodations, and the presence of a support person during labor and delivery, among other 
issues, are confined to a section of the California Code of Regulations that applies to prisons but 
not jails.” (Reproductive Health Behind Bars in California, supra, at p. 28.)  The report 
recommended aligning policies to ensure that pregnant incarcerated individuals throughout 
California are treated equitably. (Ibid.) The report also recommended adopting policies with 
gender-neutral language. (Ibid.) 
 
AB 732 (Bonta), Chapter 321, requires jails and prisons to offer incarcerated persons 
who are possibly pregnant or capable of becoming pregnant a pregnancy test, and 
requires specified medical treatment and services for incarcerated persons in county jail 
and state prison who are pregnant. Specifically, this new law:   
 
• Provides that if an incarcerated person is identified as possibly pregnant or capable of 
becoming pregnant, the incarcerated person shall be offered the opportunity to 
voluntarily take a pregnancy test. 
 
• Protects access to reproductive services, including abortions, and requires unbiased 
counseling on options that includes information on prenatal health care, adoption, and 
abortion. 
  
• States that if an incarcerated person is confirmed to be pregnant, then an examination 
must be scheduled within seven days of arrival at the jail or prison. 
 
• Provides a schedule for prenatal care visits. 
 
• Mandates that pregnant incarcerated persons have access to prenatal vitamins and 
newborn care.   
 
• Requires that a pregnant person incarcerated in a multi-tier housing unit be assigned 
to a lower bunk and lower tier housing. 
 
• States that eligible pregnant incarcerated persons are to be given notice of and access 
to community-based programs serving pregnant, birthing, or lactating incarcerated 




• Prohibits the use of tasers, pepper spray, or any other chemical weapons on pregnant 
incarcerated persons. 
 
• States that pregnant incarcerated persons who have used opioids prior to 
incarceration, or who are currently receiving methadone treatment, shall be offered 
medication assisted treatment with methadone or buprenorphine. They must also be 
given information on the risks of withdrawal. 
• Requires each incarcerated pregnant person be referred to a social worker who must 
discuss options for placement and care of the child after delivery, assist with phone 
access to contact relatives for purposes of placement of the newborn, and oversee the 
placement. 
 
• States that a pregnant incarcerated person shall be taken to a hospital for purposes of 
giving birth. They may also have a verified support person present during labor, 
childbirth, and during postpartum recovery while hospitalized. 
 
• Requires postpartum examinations by a medical provider once the incarcerated 
person is back in jail or prison. 
 
• Requires that incarcerated persons be provided materials necessary for personal 
hygiene with regard to their menstrual cycle and reproductive system, upon request. 
 
 
AB 3043 (Jones-Sawyer) – Corrections:  confidential calls 
 
The United States Constitution and the California Constitution guarantee the right to the 
assistance of an attorney for persons who are the subject of criminal prosecutions. The right to an 
attorney applies at the trial stage of a criminal proceeding and also during appeal. 
Communication with counsel is critical to the attorney-client relationship and necessary in order 
to provide adequate representation. Existing law provides inmates the right to communicate 
confidentially with a member of the California State Bar. However, it appears that this law is not 
considered applicable to telephone calls. Per California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation (CDCR) regulations, an inmate who wishes to conduct a confidential telephone 
call with an attorney must navigate the application process by which an attorney must be 
approved in order to conduct a confidential call with his or her client. Once that application is 
completed and approved, CDCR retains the authority to approve or deny confidential calls on a 
case-by-case basis. Facilities differ in their procedures and willingness to accommodate 
confidential attorney calls.   
 
AB 3043 (Jones-Sawyer) Chapter 333,  provides that CDCR must approve an attorney's 
request to make a confidential call to a client they represent at a CDCR facility, and 
requires CDCR to provide the inmate at least 30 minutes per month, per inmate, per case, 





SB 132 (Weiner) – Corrections 
 
Transgender inmates are particularly vulnerable to abuse from staff and other prisoners. 
According to the National Center for Transgender Equality, placing transgender inmates in 
facilities based on their anatomy “often put[s] them at extremely high risk of violence and 
abuse.” (National Center for Transgender Equality, LGBTQ People Behind Bars: A Guide to 
Understanding the Issues Facing Transgender Prisoners and Their Legal Rights (Oct. 2018) 
p.14.) In a 2011-2012 survey conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, almost 40% of 
transgender inmates reported that they experienced at least one incident of sexual victimization 
in state or federal prison in the last 12 months or since admission to the facility, if less than 12 
months. (See U.S. Department of Justice, Sexual Victimization in Prisons and Jails Reported by 
Inmates 2011-12, Supplemental Tables: Sexual Victimization Among Transgender Inmate Adults 
(Dec. 2014) p. 2.) 
 
The Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) was passed by Congress in 2003. (34 U.S.C. § 30301 
et seq.) Among the many stated purposes for the PREA are: to establish a zero-tolerance standard 
for the incidence of prison rape in prisons in the United States; to develop and implement 
national standards for the detection, prevention, reduction, and punishment of prison rape; to 
increase of the available data and information on the incidence of prison rape to improve the 
management and administration of correctional facilities; and to increase the accountability of 
prison officials who fail to detect, prevent, reduce, and punish prison rape. (34 U.S.C. § 30302.) 
The act also created the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission and charged it with 
developing standards for the elimination of prison rape. (34 U.S.C. § 30306.) Regarding 
transgender or intersex inmates, the PREA requires that decisions about where the inmates will 
be housed should be made on a case-by-case basis, and their own views with respect to safety 
must be given serious consideration. (PREA Standard 115.42(c) & (e).) 
 
CDCR has multiple policies in place regarding transgender inmates. Regarding CDCR housing, 
inmates identified or diagnosed by CDCR medical staff as transgender or as having gender 
dysphoria are referred to a classification committee for a determination of appropriate housing at 
a designated institution.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3269, subd. (g).)  
 
SB 132 (Wiener), Chapter 182, requires CDCR to take into account an incarcerated 
person's gender identity and perception of safety when determining where they will be 
housed.  Specifically, this new law:   
 
• Finds that, nationwide, incarcerated transgender individuals experience exceptionally 
high rates of sexual victimization.  
 
• Requires CDCR, in a private setting, to ask each individual entering into the custody 
of the department to specify their gender identity, whether they identify as 
transgender, nonbinary, or intersex, and their gender pronoun and honorific. 
 
• Prohibits CDCR from disciplining an incarcerated individual for refusing to answer, 





• Provides that at any time, a person under the jurisdiction of CDCR may inform the 
facility staff of their gender identity, and facility staff must promptly repeat the 
process of offering the individual an opportunity to specify the gender pronoun and 
honorific most appropriate for staff to use in reference to that individual, as specified 
above. 
 
• Requires CDCR staff, contractors, and volunteers to consistently use the gender 
pronoun and honorific an individual has specified in all verbal and written 
communications with or regarding that individual. 
 
• Defines “gender pronoun” as a third-person singular personal pronoun such as “he,” 
“she,” or “they.” 
 
• Defines “honorific” as a form of respectful address typically combined with an 
individual’s surname. 
 
• Requires that an individual incarcerated by CDCR who is transgender, nonbinary, or 
intersex, regardless of anatomy, be: 
 
o Addressed in a manner consistent with the incarcerated individual’s gender 
identity; 
 
o Searched according to the search policy for their gender identity or according 
to the gender designation of the facility where they are housed, based on the 
individual’s search preference; 
 
o Searched according to the gender designation of the facility where the 
incarcerated individual is housed if their preference or gender identity cannot 
be determined; 
 
o Housed at a correctional facility designated for men or women based on the 
individual’s preference, including, if eligible, at a residential program for 
individuals under the jurisdiction of the department; and 
 
o Have their perception of health and safety given serious consideration in any 
bed assignment, placement, or programming decision within the facility in 
which they are housed, and the reasons for the department’s denial of an 
alternative on this basis documented and shared with the individual. 
 
• Provides that if CDCR has management or security concerns with an incarcerated 
individual's search or housing preference, CDCR must certify in writing a specific 





• Prohibits CDCR from denying an individual’s search or housing preference based on 
any discriminatory reason, including but not limited to: 
 
o The anatomy, including, but not limited to, the genitalia or other physical 
characteristics, of the incarcerated person; 
 
o The sexual orientation of the incarcerated person; or 
 
o A factor present among other people incarcerated at the preferred type of 
housing facility. 
 
• Requires that an incarcerated individual’s housing and placement be reassessed if the 









AB 1927 (Boerner-Horvath) – Witness testimony in sexual assault cases:  inadmissibility in 
a separate prosecution 
 
Existing law provides for the granting of immunity upon the petition of the prosecution and a 
finding by the court that such immunity is in the public interest. A victim or witness may be 
granted immunity for their testimony in a felony prosecution through a process known as 
“compelled testimony.” In that procedure, the victim or witness must first formally refuse to 
testify or provide evidence, invoking the rationale that doing so may incriminate them. The court 
can then “compel” the person to testify, granting immunity from prosecution for their statements 
and evidence in the process. A grant of immunity means that the prosecution cannot use the 
witness’ testimony again them in any future prosecution. 
 
The compelled testimony procedure can be traumatic and complicated for victims and witnesses, 
who have often already been traumatized by virtue of being the witness to, or victim of, a sexual 
assault. Reports have shown that sexual assaults often go unreported and some believe that the 
procedure of compelled testimony may be a factor in deterring people from coming forward.  
This may be particularly true when drugs or alcohol are being consumed at or around the time of 
a sexual assault, such as one that takes place at a house party or on or around a college campus.  
 
AB 1927 (Boerner Horvath), Chapter 241, provides that the testimony of a victim or 
witness in a felony prosecution for specified sex crimes that the victim or witness, at or 
around the time of crime, unlawfully possessed or used a controlled substance or alcohol 
inadmissible in a separate prosecution of that victim or witness to prove illegal 
possession or use of that controlled substance or alcohol.  Specifically, this new law: 
 
• States that the testimony of a victim or witness in a felony prosecution for assault or 
burglary with the intent to commit specified sex crimes, sexual battery, rape, statutory 
rape, sodomy, oral copulation, lewd or lascivious acts, sexual penetration, that the 
victim or witness, at or around the time of the sex crime unlawfully possessed or used 
a control substance or alcohol is inadmissible in a separate prosecution of that victim 
or witness to prove illegal possession or use of that controlled substance or alcohol. 
 
• Specifies that evidence that the testifying witness unlawfully possessed or used a 
controlled substance or alcohol is not excluded from use in the felony prosecution for 
a violation or attempted violation of specified sex crimes. 
 
• Specifies that evidence that a witness received use immunity for testimony is not 








AB 2147 (Reyes) – Convictions:  expungement:  inmate hand crews 
 
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), in cooperation with the 
California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) and the Los Angeles County 
Fire Department (LAC FIRE), jointly operates 43 conservation camps, commonly known as fire 
camps, located in 27 counties. All camps are minimum-security facilities and all are staffed with 
correctional staff. 
 
Overall, there are approximately 3,100 inmates working at fire camps currently. All inmates 
receive the same entry-level training that CAL FIRE’s seasonal firefighters receive in addition to 
ongoing training from CAL FIRE throughout the time they are in the program. An inmate must 
volunteer for the fire camp program; no one is involuntarily assigned to work in a fire camp. 
Volunteers must have “minimum custody” status, or the lowest classification for inmates based 
on their sustained good behavior in prison, their conforming to rules within the prison and 
participation in rehabilitative programming. 
 
Existing law provides procedures in which a person who has been arrested for, or convicted of, a 
criminal offense, can petition a court to have his or her conviction dismissed or “expunged.”  
Under existing law, an expungement does not relieve a person of the duty to disclose such a 
conviction when seeking licensing by the state. California has a large number of professions 
which require an individual to be licensed in order to engage in those activities. Inmate 
firefighters can have difficulty getting an EMT license because of their prior convictions.  
Without an EMT license, these same individuals can be excluded from jobs with firefighting 
organizations. 
  
AB 2147 (Reyes), Chapter 60, allows a defendant who successfully participated in Fire 
Camp, as specified, to petition for a dismissal of their conviction, releasing the defendant 
from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense, except as provided. A defendant 
granted this dismissal shall not be required to disclose the conviction on an application for 
licensure by any state or local agency, with certain exceptions. Specifically, this new law: 
• Provides that a defendant who has successfully participated in a Fire Camp, as 
determined by the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 
(CDCR), or successfully participated as a member of a county incarcerated individual 
hand crew, as determined by the appropriate county authority, and has been released from 
custody, the defendant is eligible for expungement relief, except that incarcerated 
individuals who have been convicted of specified serious crimes. 
• Specifies that to be eligible for relief, the defendant is not required to complete the term 
of their probation, parole, or supervised release. 
• States that expungement relief is available for all convictions for which the defendant is 
serving a sentence at the time the defendant successfully participates in one of the 
required programs. 
• Provides that if all of the requirements are met, the court, in its discretion and in the 
interest of justice, may dismiss the accusations or information against the defendant and 
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the defendant shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from 
the offense of which the defendant has been convicted, except as specified. 
• Specifies that a defendant who is granted expungement shall not be required to disclose 
the conviction on an application for licensure by any state or local agency, except in an 
application for licensure by the Commission on Teacher Credentialing, a position as a 




AB 2512 (Stone, M.) – Death Penalty: person with an intellectual disability 
 
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court ruled that it is unconstitutional to execute someone 
with an intellectual disability. (Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536 U.S. 304, 321 (Atkins).) The Court 
left it up to the states to “‘develop[] appropriate ways’” to ensure that intellectually disabled 
defendants are not sentenced to death. (Id. at p. 317, quoting Ford v. Wainwright (1986) 477 
U.S. 399, 416-417.) The following year, the Legislature added Penal Code section 1376 to 
implement this decision. The intellectual disability standard set forth in the statute was derived 
from the two clinical definitions referenced by the Court in Atkins. (In re Hawthorne (2005) 35 
Cal.4th 40, 44, 47-48.) Unfortunately, despite the fact that clinical standards have changed over 
the years, the statute has not been updated.  
 
Regarding post-conviction relief, California Supreme Court guidance provides that a claim of 
intellectual disability should be raised by a petition for writ of habeas corpus. By its terms, the 
standards and procedures set forth in Penal Code section 1376 apply only to pre-conviction 
proceedings. However, our state High Court has concluded that post-conviction proceedings 
should “track[] section 1376 as closely as logic and practicality permit….” (In re Hawthorne, 
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 47.) 
 
AB 2512 (Stone), Chapter 331, authorizes a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of 
death to apply for an order directing that a hearing to determine intellectual disability be 
conducted as part of a habeas corpus petition and revises the definition of intellectual 
disability. Specifically, this new law:   
 
• States that the United States Supreme Court has recognized that it is unconstitutional 
to execute a person with an intellectual disability. It is the intent of the Legislature 
that California adopt the professional medical community’s definition and 
understanding of intellectual disability. It is the further intent of the Legislature that 
individuals with intellectual disabilities be accurately and quickly identified to avoid 
protracted and unnecessary litigation. 
 
• Revises the definition of "intellectual disability" to mean the condition of 
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with 
deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested before the end of the developmental 




• Defines "prima facie showing of intellectual disability" to mean that the defendant's 
allegation of intellectual disability is based on the type of evidence typically relied on 
by a qualified expert in diagnosing intellectual disability, as defined in current clinical 
standards, or when a qualified expert provides a declaration diagnosing the defendant 
as intellectually disabled. 
 
• Requires the court to order a hearing to determine whether the defendant is a person 
with an intellectual disability upon a prima facie showing, as defined. 
 
• Authorizes a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of death to apply for an order 
directing that a hearing to determine intellectual disability be conducted as part of a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  
 
• Provides that when the claim of intellectual disability is raised in a petition for habeas 
corpus and a petitioner makes a prima facie showing of intellectual disability, the 
reviewing court shall issue an order to show cause if the petitioner has met the prima 
facie standard.  
 
• Specifies that the petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the petitioner is a person with an intellectual disability.  
 
• Provides that the state may present its case regarding the issue of whether the 
petitioner is a person with an intellectual disability. Each party may offer rebuttal 
evidence. 
 
• Provides that during an evidentiary hearing under the habeas corpus provisions, an 
expert may testify about the contents of out-of-court statements, including 
documentary evidence and statements from witnesses when those types of statements 
are accepted by the medical community as relevant to a diagnosis of intellectual 
disability if the expert relied upon these statements as the basis for their opinion.  
 
• Prohibits changing or adjusting the results of a test measuring intellectual functioning 
based on race, ethnicity, national origin, or socioeconomic status. 
 
 
AB 2542 (Kalra) – Criminal procedure:  discrimination 
 
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court issued a landmark ruling on the issue of racial bias and 
prejudice in the American Court System – McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) 481 U.S. 279 
(McCleskey). The McCleskey opinion has had far-reaching effects on a wide array of equal 
protection claims. “The precedent impairs constitutional challenges based on widespread racial 
disparities not just in capital sentencing, but in the criminal-justice system more widely; it 
requires defendants to prove discrimination on a specific basis, providing clear evidence that 
they were explicitly targeted because of their race. If police officers, prosecutors, judges, or 
others don’t openly acknowledge their own prejudices, defendants face a prohibitively high bar 
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fighting for their Fourteenth Amendment rights in court.” (Neklason, The “Death Penalty’s Dred 
Scott” Lives on, The Atlantic (June 14, 2019).) 
 
AB 2542 (Kalra), Chapter 317, prohibits the state from seeking or obtaining a 
conviction or sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin. Specifically, this 
new law:   
 
• Prohibits the state from seeking or obtaining a criminal conviction or seeking, 
obtaining, or imposing a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.  
• Applies prospectively in cases in which a judgment has not been entered prior to January 1, 
2021. 
• States that a violation of this prohibition is established if the defendant proves, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, any of the following: 
o The judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the 
case, an expert witness, or juror exhibited bias or animus towards the 
defendant because of the defendant's race, ethnicity, or national origin; 
o During the defendant’s trial, in court and during the proceedings, the judge, an 
attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert 
witness, or juror, used racially discriminatory language about the defendant's 
race, ethnicity, or national origin, except as specified, or otherwise exhibited 
bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant's race, 
ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful; 
o The defendant was charged or convicted of a more serious offense than 
defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins who commit similar 
offenses and are similarly situated and the evidence establishes that the 
prosecution more frequently sought or obtained convictions for more serious 
offenses against people who share the defendant's race, ethnicity, or national 
origin in the county where the convictions were sought or obtained; 
o A longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was 
imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense, 
and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for that 
offense on people that share the defendant's race, ethnicity, or national origin 
than on defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins in the county 
where the sentence was imposed; or, 
o A longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was 
imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense, 
and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for the 
same offense on defendants in cases with victims of one race, ethnicity, or 
national origin than in cases with victims of other races, ethnicities, or 
national origins in the county where the sentence was imposed. 
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• States that a defendant may file a motion in the trial court, or if judgement has been 
imposed, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate the 
conviction or sentence in a court of competent jurisdiction alleging a violation of the 
prohibition. 
• States that if a motion is filed in the trial court and the defendant makes a prima facie 
showing of a violation, the court shall hold a hearing. 
• Provides that at the hearing, evidence may be presented by either party, including but 
not limited to, statistical evidence, aggregate data, expert testimony, and the sworn 
testimony of witnesses. The court may also appoint an independent expert. 
• States that the defendant shall have the burden of proving the violation by a 
preponderance of the evidence and at the conclusion of the hearing, the court shall 
make findings on the record. 
• Provides that a defendant may file a motion requesting disclosure of all evidence 
relevant to a potential violation of the prohibition that is in the possession or control 
of the state. Upon a showing of good cause, and if the records are not privileged, the 
court shall order the records to be released. Upon a showing of good cause, the court 
may permit the prosecution to redact information prior to disclosure. 
• States that, notwithstanding any other law, except for an initiative approved by the 
voters, if the court finds by a preponderance of evidence a violation of the 
prohibition, the court shall impose a remedy specific to the violation found from the 
following list of remedies: 
o Before a judgment has been entered, the court may reseat a juror removed by 
use of a peremptory challenge, declare a mistrial if requested by the 
defendant, discharge the jury panel and empanel a new jury, or, in the interests 
of justice, the court may dismiss enhancements, special circumstances, or 
special allegations, or reduce one or more charges; 
o When judgment has been entered: 
§ If the court finds that the conviction was sought or obtained in 
violation of the prohibition, the court shall vacate the conviction and 
sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings;  
§ If the court finds the violation was based only on the defendant being 
charged or convicted of a more serious offense than defendants of 
other races, ethnicities, or national origins, and the court has the ability 
to rectify the violation by modifying the judgment, the court shall 
vacate the judgment and sentence, find that the conviction is legally 
invalid, and modify the judgment to impose an appropriate remedy for 
the violation that occurred, except that the court shall not impose a 
sentence greater than that previously imposed; and, 
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§ If the court finds that only the sentence was sought, obtained, or 
imposed in violation of the prohibition, the court shall vacate the 
sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and impose a new sentence no 
greater than the sentence previously imposed. 
• Prohibits imposition of the death penalty where the court finds a violation of the 
prohibition.  
• Provides that the remedies available under this provision do not foreclose any other 
remedies available under the United States Constitution, the California Constitution, 
or any other law. 
• Specifies that these provisions apply to adjudications and dispositions in the juvenile 
delinquency system. 
• Provides that these provisions do not prevent the prosecution of hate crimes. 
• Defines "more frequently sought or obtained" or "more frequently imposed" as meaning that 
statistical evidence or aggregate data demonstrate a significant difference in seeking 
or obtaining convictions or in imposing sentences comparing individuals who have 
committed similar offenses and are similarly situated and the prosecution cannot 
establish race-neutral reasons for the disparity. 
• Defines "prima facie showing" as meaning that the defendant produces facts that, if 
true, establish a substantial likelihood that a violation of the prohibition occurred. 
“Substantial likelihood” requires more than a mere possibility, but less than a 
standard of more likely than not.  
• Defines "racially discriminatory language" as meaning language that, to an objective 
observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias, including, but not limited to, 
racially charged or racially coded language, language that compares the defendant to 
an animal, or language that references the defendant's physical appearance, culture, 
ethnicity or national origin. Evidence that particular words or images are used 
exclusively or disproportionately in cases where the defendant is of a specific race, 
ethnicity, or national origin is relevant to determining whether language is 
discriminatory. 
• Defines “state” as including the Attorney General, a district attorney, or a city 
prosecutor. 
• Provides that a defendant may share a race, ethnicity, or national origin with more 
than one group and may aggregate data among groups to demonstrate a violation of 
the prohibition. 
• Specifies that a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted after a judgment has been 
entered based on evidence of a violation of the prohibition if the judgment was 
entered on or after January 1, 2021. 
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• States that a petition raising such a claim for the first time, or on the basis of new 
discovery provided by the state or other new evidence that could not have been 
previously known by the petitioner with due diligence, shall not be deemed a 
successive or abusive petition. 
• Provides that if a petitioner already has a habeas corpus petition pending in state 
court, but it has not yet been decided, the petitioner may amend the existing petition 
with a claim of a violation of the prohibition. 
• Requires the petition to state if the petitioner requests appointment of counsel and the 
court to appoint counsel if the petitioner cannot afford counsel and either the petition 
alleges facts that would establish a violation of the prohibition or the State Public 
Defender requests counsel be appointed. Newly appointed counsel may amend a 
petition filed before their appointment. 
• Requires the court to review the petition and if the court determines the petitioner has 
made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the court shall issue an order to 
show cause why relief shall not be granted and hold an evidentiary hearing, unless the 
state declines to show cause.  
• Provides that the defendant shall appear at the hearing by video unless counsel 
indicates that their presence is needed. 
• States that if the court determines that the petitioner has not established a prima facie 
showing of entitlement to relief, the court shall state the factual and legal basis for its 
conclusion on the record or issue a written order detailing the factual and legal basis 
for its conclusion. 
 
• Makes conforming changes to allow a person who is no longer in custody to vacate a 
conviction or sentence based on a violation of the prohibition. 
 
• Contains a severability clause. 
 
• Makes a number of Legislative findings and declarations including that it is the intent 
of the Legislature to eliminate racial bias from California's criminal justice system 
because racism in any form or amount, at any stage of a criminal trial, is intolerable, 
inimical to a fair criminal justice system, is a miscarriage of justice under Article VI 







CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAMS 
 
 
AB 1304 (Waldron) – California MAT RE-entry Incentive Program 
 
In 2016, Governor Brown approved SB 843 which required the California Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), under the direction of the Undersecretary of Health 
Care Services, to develop and implement a three-year medically assisted treatment (MAT) pilot 
program at one or more of CDCR's institutions. The program operated at three state prisons.  
The original three pilots were the foundation for what is now CDCR’s Integrated Substance Use 
Disorder Treatment Program (ISUDT). The elements of the ISUDT program -- (1) intake 
assessments, (2) cognitive behavioral interventions (aka DRP programming), (3) supportive 
housing, (4) MAT, (5) enhanced pre-release processes with American Society of Addiction 
Medicine assessments, and (5) transition to community – are operating statewide with over 4580 
program participants receiving MAT statewide.   
Most individuals in state prisons will eventually return to communities, and there is a need to 
enable and encourage their successful reintegration. The addition of MAT for the treatment of 
justice-involved individuals increases the likelihood of successful treatment and reduces 
recidivism. (National Sheriffs’ Association, Reducing Recidivism with Medication Assisted 
Treatment in Jails (Nov. 2017) p. 1.)  
 
AB 1304 (Waldron), Chapter 325, establishes the California MAT Re-Entry Incentive 
Program which makes a person on parole under the supervision of CDCR, except as 
specified, eligible for a reduction in the period of parole if the person successfully 
participates in a substance abuse treatment program, as specified, including medication-
assisted treatment. Specifically, this new law:   
• Establishes the California MAT Re-Entry Incentive Program. 
 
• Makes a person eligible for a 30-day reduction to the period of parole for every six 
months of treatment that is not ordered by the court, up to a maximum 90-day 
reduction, if the person meets all of the following requirements:  
 
o The person has been released from state prison on parole supervision by 
CDCR; 
 
o The person has been enrolled in, or successfully participated in, an 
institutional substance abuse program; and, 
 
o The person successfully participates in a substance abuse treatment program 
that employs a multifaceted approach to treatment, including the use of United 
States Food and Drug Administration approved MAT, and, whenever 
possible, is provided through a program licensed or certified by the State 
Department of Health Care Services, including federally qualified health 
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centers (FQHS), community clinics, and Native American Health Centers. 
 
• Specifies that the sentence reduction shall be contingent upon successful participation 
in treatment, as determined by the treatment provider. 
 
• Provides that this incentive program does not apply to the following: 
 
o Inmates who have been sentenced for a violent sex offense, as specified; 
 
o Inmates who have been convicted of an offense for which the inmate has 
received a life sentence for kidnapping during the course of a carjacking, with 
the intent to commit a specified sex offense, or other specified sex offenses; 
or, 
 
o Inmates who have been convicted of and are required to register as a sex 
offender for the commission of a specified sex offense in which one or more 
of the victims of the offense was a child under 14 years of age. 
 
• Makes operation of this program contingent upon the appropriation to the State 
Department of Health Care Services of funds received pursuant to a federal Substance 
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) opiod use disorder or 
substance use disorder grant. To the extent consistent with the terms of the grant, the 
sum of one million dollars ($1,000,000) of the grant funds appropriated for these 
purposes shall be allocated to CDCR for use in implementing this program. 
 
• Requires CDCR to collect data and analyze utilization and program outcomes and to 
provide that information in the report required pursuant to the medication assisted 
treatment for substance abuse pilot program. 
 
 
AB 2741 (Rubio, B.) – Children’s advocacy centers 
 
Children’s Advocacy Centers (CAC’s) are at the forefront of the fight against the abuse and 
exploitation of vulnerable individuals. CAC’s are able to address a continuum of care for abused 
children with a wide breadth of personnel including law enforcement, child protection entities, 
and medical professionals. These services are a critical foundation to ensuring abused children 
receive the resources and protections they require. However, without a statutory definition of the 
services that must be provided at these centers, there can be confusion as to what services are 
available to the children and the families served by them. 
 
AB 2741 (Blanca Rubio), Chapter 353, authorizes counties to create CAC’s in order to 






• Authorizes counties to utilize a CAC in order to implement coordinated 
multidisciplinary responses to investigate reports involving child physical or sexual 
abuse, exploitation, or maltreatment. 
 
• Requires any county that utilizes a CAC to coordinate its multidisciplinary response 
to meet the following standards: 
 
o The multidisciplinary team associated with the CAC shall consist of a 
representative of the CAC and at least one representative from each of the 
following disciplines: law enforcement, child protective services, district 
attorney’s office, medical providers, mental health providers, victim advocate, 
or a representative of the CAC. Members of the multidisciplinary team may 
fill more than one role as needed;  
 
o The multidisciplinary team, as utilized through the CAC, shall have cultural 
competency and diversity training to meet the needs of the community it 
serves; 
 
o The CAC shall have a designated legal entity responsible for the governance 
of its operations. This entity shall oversee ongoing business practices of the 
CAC, including setting and implementing administrative policies, hiring and 
managing personnel, obtaining funding, supervising program and fiscal 
operations, and long-term planning; 
 
o The CAC shall provide a dedicated child-focused setting designed to provide 
a safe, comfortable and neutral place where forensic interviews and other 
CAC services can be appropriately provided for children and families; 
 
o The CAC shall produce written protocols for case review and case review 
procedures. Additionally, the CAC shall use a case tracking system to provide 
information on essential demographics and case information; 
 
o The CAC shall verify that members of the multidisciplinary team responsible 
for medical evaluations have specific training in child abuse or child sexual 
abuse examinations;  
 
o The CAC shall verify that members of the multidisciplinary team responsible 
for mental health services are trained in, and deliver, trauma-focused, 
evidence supported, mental health treatments; and, 
 
o The CAC shall verify that interviews conducted in the course of investigations 
are conducted in a forensically sound manner and occur in a child-focused 





• Provides that counties are not limited to utilizing only one CAC.  
 
• States that the files, reports, records, communications, and working papers used or 
developed in providing services through a CAC are confidential and not public 
records. 
 
• Authorizes a multidisciplinary team at a CAC to share with other multidisciplinary 
team members any information or records concerning the child and family and the 
person who is the subject of the investigation of suspected child abuse or neglect for 
the sole purpose of facilitating a forensic interview or case discussion or providing 
services to the child or family; provided, however, that the shared information or 
records shall be treated as privileged and confidential to the extent required by law by 
the receiving multidisciplinary team members. 
 
 
AB 3099 (Ramos) – Department of Justice: law enforcement assistance with tribal issues 
 
According to most recent census data, California is home to more people of Native American 
and Alaska Native heritage than any other state in the country. There are currently 109 federally 
recognized Indian tribes and over 70 non-federally recognized tribes in California. Tribes in 
California currently have nearly 100 separate reservations or rancherias. There are also a number 
of individual Indian trust allotments. These lands constitute “Indian country.”  
 
In passing Public Law 83-280, Congress expressly granted California concurrent criminal 
jurisdiction with California’s tribal governments over specified areas of Indian country within 
the state for the enforcement of statewide criminal laws. A lack of consistency in the application 
of Public Law 280 on California Indian country currently exists statewide as advocates argue that 
this creates jurisdictional uncertainty for local law enforcement and California tribes with Indian 
land. This uncertainty applies specifically in the context of missing persons. 
 
Existing law establishes a California missing persons registry, in addition to other missing 
persons networks and databases that are designed to assist law enforcement in their 
investigations of missing and unidentified persons in California. However, there is public 
concern that when crimes are committed on these lands, they are not properly documented and 
investigated 
AB 3099 (Ramos) Chapter 170, requires the Department of Justice, upon funding, to 
provide technical assistance relating to tribal issues to local law enforcement agencies, as 
specified, and tribal governments with Indian lands. Specifically, this new law: 
• Provides that to improve upon the implementation of concurrent criminal jurisdiction on 
California Indian lands, the Department of Justice shall, subject to an appropriation by 
the Legislature, in a manner to be prescribed by the department, provide technical 
assistance to local law enforcement agencies that have Indian lands within or abutting 
their jurisdictions, and to tribal governments with Indian lands, including those with and 





o Providing guidance for law enforcement education and training on policing and 
criminal investigations on Indian lands that supports consistent implementation 
of California’s responsibilities for enforcing statewide criminal laws on Indian 
lands that protect the health, safety, and welfare of tribal citizens on Indian lands; 
 
o Providing guidance on improving crime reporting, crime statistics, criminal 
procedures, and investigative tools for conducting police investigations of 
statewide criminal laws on Indian lands; 
 
o Providing educational materials about the complexities of concurrent criminal 
jurisdiction with tribal governments and their tribal law enforcement agencies, 
specifically to tribal citizens on Indian lands, including information on how to 
report a crime, and information relating to victim’s rights and victim services in 
California; and, 
 
o Facilitating and supporting improved communication between local law 
enforcement agencies and tribal governments or tribal law enforcement agencies 
for purposes of consistent implementation of concurrent criminal jurisdiction on 
California Indian lands. 
 
• States that to address the issues involving missing and murdered Native Americans in 
California, particularly missing and murdered Native American women and girls, the 
department shall, subject to an appropriation by the Legislature, in a manner to be 
prescribed by the department, conduct a study to determine how to increase state 
criminal justice protective and investigative resources for reporting and identifying 
missing Native Americans in California, particularly women and girls. The study shall 
include all of the following: 
 
o A determination of the scope of the issue of missing and murdered Native 
Americans in California, particularly women and girls; 
 
o Identification of barriers in reporting or investigating missing Native Americans 
in California, particularly women and girls; and, 
 
o Ways to create partnerships to increase cross-reporting and investigation of 
missing Native Americans in California, particularly women and girls, between 
federal, state, local, and tribal governments, including tribal governments without 
tribal law enforcement agencies. 
 
• States that as part of the study, the department shall conduct outreach to tribal 
governments in California, Native American communities, local, tribal, state, and federal 
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law enforcement agencies, and state and tribal courts. 
 
• Requires the department to submit a report to the Legislature upon completion of the 
study. The report shall include all of the following: 
 
o Data and analysis of the number of missing Native Americans in California, 
particularly women and girls; 
 
o Identification of the barriers to providing state resources to address the issue; and, 
 
o Recommendations, including any proposed legislation, to improve the reporting 




AB 3234 (Ting) – Public Safety 
 
Multiple diversion programs exist under current law, including for misdemeanors generally. (See 
Pen. Code, §§ 1001 et seq., 1001.50 et seq.) The Legislature has authorized the prosecution to 
approve a local misdemeanor diversion program. No program can continue without the 
prosecution’s approval, and no person can be diverted unless the program has been approved by 
the prosecution. (Pen. Code, §§ 1001.2, subd. (b), 1001.50, subd. (b).) The prosecution is not, 
however, authorized to determine whether a particular defendant is diverted. (Ibid.)  
 
The Legislature has not provided the trial courts with a general grant of power to institute 
diversion programs on their own initiative. (People v. Tapia (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 9.) 
A trial court cannot grant diversion to a defendant, outside a diversion program mandated by the 
state or by local government, and over the objection of the prosecuting attorney. (Ibid., People v. 
Marroquin (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th Supp. 31, 37.) 
 
In 2017, the Legislature passed AB 1448 (Weber), Chapter 676, which established the Elderly 
Parole Program to be administered by the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH). (Pen. Code, § 3055.) 
Under the Elderly Parole Program, inmates who are 60 years of age or older and have served 25 
years of continuous incarceration on their current sentence are to have their parole suitability 
considered. (Pen. Code, § 3055, subd. (a).)  
 
The Elderly Parole Program does not apply to an individual who has been sentenced under the 
"Three Strikes" Law, who has been sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole or 
death, or who has been convicted of first-degree murder of a peace officer, as specified. (Pen. 
Code, § 3055, subds. (g) & (h).) When considering release of an individual under the program, 
the BPH must consider “whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, 
have reduced the elderly inmate's risk for future violence.” (Pen. Code, §, 3055, subd. (c).) 
 
AB 3234 (Ting), Chapter 334, creates a court-initiated misdemeanor diversion program 
and lowers the minimum age limitation for the Elderly Parole Program to inmates who 
are 50 years of age and who have served a minimum of 20 years. Specifically, this new 
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law:   
 
• Authorizes a superior court judge to offer diversion to a person charged with a 
misdemeanor over the objection of a prosecuting attorney, except that a defendant 
may not be offered diversion for any of the following currently charged offenses: 
 
o Any offense for which  a person, if convicted, would be required to register as 
a sex offender; 
 
o A domestic violence offense; or 
 
o A stalking offense. 
 
• Provides that a judge may continue a diverted case for a period not to exceed 24 
months and order the defendant to comply with terms, conditions, or programs that 
the judge deems appropriate based on the defendant's specific situation. 
 
• States that if the defendant has complied with the imposed terms and conditions, at 
the end of the diversion period, the judge must dismiss the action against the 
defendant. 
 
• Requires the court to provide the defendant notice and hold a hearing to determine 
whether criminal proceedings should be reinstated if it appears to the court that the 
defendant is not complying with the terms and conditions of diversion. If the court 
finds that the defendant has not complied with the terms and conditions of diversion, 
the court may end the diversion and order resumption of the criminal proceedings. 
 
• Provides that in order for a defendant who is diverted pursuant to this provision to 
have their action dismissed, they must complete all conditions ordered by the court, 
make full restitution, and comply with any court-ordered protective order, stay-away 
order, or order prohibiting firearm possession. However, a defendant's inability to pay 
restitution due to indigence shall not be grounds for denial of diversion or a finding 
that the defendant has failed to comply with the terms of diversion. 
 
• States that upon successful completion of the court-ordered terms, conditions, or 
programs of diversion, the arrest upon which diversion was imposed shall be deemed 
to never have occurred. The defendant may indicate in response to any question 
concerning their prior criminal record that they were not arrested.  
 
• Prohibits, without the defendant's consent, using a record pertaining to an arrest 
resulting in successful completion of diversion in any way that could result in the 
denial of any employment, benefit, license, or certificate.  
 
• Requires the defendant be advised that, regardless of their successful completion of 
diversion, the arrest on which the diversion was based may be disclosed by the 
Department of Justice in response to a peace officer application request and that, 
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notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, the defendant is not relieved of the 
obligation to disclose the arrest in response to a direct question contained in a 
questionnaire or application for a position as a peace officer, as defined. 
 
• Lowers the minimum age limitation for the Elderly Parole Program to inmates who 
are 50 years of age instead of 60 years of age and who have served a minimum of 20 
years of continuous incarceration instead of a minimum of 25 years of continuous 
incarceration. 
 
• Provides that by December 31, 2022, the board shall complete all elderly parole 
hearings for individuals who were sentenced to determinate or indeterminate terms 
and who, on the effective date of the bill that added this subdivision, are or will be 
entitled to have their parole suitability considered at an elderly parole hearing before 
January 1, 2023. 
 
 
SB 903 (Grove) – Grand Theft:  Agricultural Equipment 
 
Previous legislation (SB 224 (Grove), Chapter 119, Statutes of 2019) provided that in counties 
participating in a rural crime prevention program, the proceeds of any fine imposed for 
conviction of the crime of grand theft of agricultural equipment shall be allocated to the Central 
Valley Rural Crime Prevention Program or the Central Coast Rural Crime Prevention Program. 
 
The State Controller recently indicated these funds cannot be distributed without correcting a 
cross reference to the existing Central Valley and Central Coast Rural Crime Prevention Program 
fund distribution formula. 
 
SB 903 (Grove), Chapter 232, requires the proceeds of a fine imposed for grand theft 
involving agricultural equipment be allocated according to the Rural Crime Prevention 




SB 1276 (Rubio, S.) – The Comprehensive Statewide Domestic Violence Program 
 
The Legislature made findings that the problem of domestic violence is of serious and increasing 
magnitude; and that existing domestic violence services are underfunded and that some areas of 
the state are unserved or underserved. These structural issues have been compounded since 
March 2020, when impacts to fundraising and volunteering began due to COVID-19. At the 
same time, reports of incidents of domestic violence began to rise.   
 
Under existing law, a “domestic violence shelter service provider” is “a victim services provider 
that operates an established system of services providing safe and confidential emergency 
housing on a 24-hour basis for victims of domestic violence and their children, including, but not 
limited to, hotel or motel arrangements, haven, and safe houses” To receive state funding, 
existing law requires that for these centers to receive state dollars, they must show a cash or an 
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in-kind match of at least 10 percent of the funds received under the law.  
 
As a result of the stay at home orders, and limitations on public gatherings which began in March 
2020, DVSSPs have been unable to host traditional fundraising events. Additionally, the current 
economic recession has negatively impacted giving by donors. During the COVID-19 crises 
response, the Governor temporarily suspended the matching requirement in emergency 
regulations. 
 
SB 1276 (Rubio), Chapter 249, eliminates the requirement that state funding be matched 
by 10 percent to qualify a local domestic violence shelter service provider with funding 







AB 901 (Gipson) – Juveniles 
 
The school-to-prison pipeline refers to policies and practices that push students out of school and 
into the juvenile and criminal justice systems.  The policies and practices including zero-
tolerance discipline policies, policing in schools, and court involvement for minor offenses in 
school.   
 
One strategy to mitigate the school-to-prison pipeline is for schools, districts, and states to 
evaluate their disciplinary policies and make punitive consequences, such as ticketing, fines 
imposed on students and/or their parents and guardians, or any punishment that removes students 
from the classroom, a last resort.  Punitive police can be replaced with systems that support 
students in an effort to reduce students encountering the legal system. 
AB 901 (Gipson), Chapter 323, repeals the jurisdiction of the juvenile criminal court over 
minors who habitually refuse to obey the reasonable and proper orders or directions of school 
authorities and provides direction as to when probation departments can engage with minors 
that are not on probation. Specifically, this new law: 
• Repeals the jurisdiction of the juvenile criminal court over minors who habitually refuse 
to obey the reasonable and proper orders or directions of school authorities.  
  
• Requires a peace officer to refer a minor who persistently or habitually refuses to obey 
the reasonable and proper orders or directions of the minor's parents or has four or more 
truancies within one school year to a community-based resource, the probation 
department, a health agency, a local educational agency, or other governmental entities 
that may provide services. 
 
• States that services offered to minors or minor's parents or guardians who are not on 
probation are voluntary and shall not include probation conditions or consequences as a 
result of not engaging in or completing those programs or services.  
 
• Directs probation to refer minors to services provided by a health agency, community-
based resource, the probation department, a health agency, a local educational agency, or 
other governmental entities that may provide services, as specified. 
 
• Specifies that a county board of education may enroll pupils in a county community 
school when the pupil is between 12 and 17 years of age, inclusive, and has been reported 








AB 1775 (Jones-Sawyer) – False reports and harassment 
 
Existing law prohibits the use of a telephone for the purpose of annoying or harassing an 
individual through the 911 line. It also provides that it is unlawful to knowingly use the 911 
telephone system for any reason other than an emergency. 
 
Current law on false police reporting does not address the growing number of cases in which 
peace officers are summoned to violate the rights of individuals for engaging in everyday 
activities, such as those individuals essentially living their lives.  Recently, media reports people 
calling 911 and making a false claim to harass a person, and a number of these incidents it 
appears by the language used that the harassment was in part because the person was a member 
of a protected class. In considering this issue, the Legislature declared their intent to end 
instances of 911 emergency system calls that are aimed at violating the rights of individuals 
based upon race, religion, sex, gender expression, or any other protected class.  
 
The Legislature declared that all Californians, including people of color, should have the liberty 
to live their lives, and to go about their business, without living under the threat or fear of being 
confronted by police. Prejudicial 911 emergency system calls cause mistrust between 
communities of color and institutions, and those calls further deteriorate community-police 
relations.  
 
AB 1775 (Jones-Sawyer) Chapter 327, makes it a crime to knowingly allow the use of or to 
use the 911 emergency system for the purpose of harassing another. Specifically, this new 
law: 
 
• Punishes the use of the 911 emergency system for the purpose of harassing another is a 
crime that is punishable as follows: 
 
o For a first violation, as an infraction punishable by a two-hundred-fifty dollar 
($250) fine or as a misdemeanor punishable by up to six months in a county jail, a 
fine of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that imprisonment and 
fine. 
 
o For a second or subsequent violation, as a misdemeanor punishable by up to six 
months in a county jail, a fine of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both 
that imprisonment and fine. 
 
• Punishes the use of the 911 emergency system for the purpose of harassing another 
person and that act is an unlawful hate crime, providing that the person who commits the 
act is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in a county jail, a fine of not 
less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by 
both that imprisonment and fine. 
 
• Provides that this section does not apply to uses of the 911 emergency system by a person 
with an intellectual disability or other mental disability that makes it difficult or 
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impossible for the person to understand the potential consequences of their actions. 
 
• Provides that, for purposes of this new law, “intimidation by threat of violence” includes, 
but is not limited to, “making or threatening to make a claim or report to a peace officer 
or law enforcement agency that falsely alleges that another person has engaged in 
unlawful activity or in an activity that requires law enforcement intervention, knowing 
that the claim or report is false, or with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the 
claim or report.” 
 
 
AB 2655 (Gipson) – Invasion of privacy: first responders 
 
Existing laws severely limit a government entity’s right and ability to share photos of deceased 
persons. For example, coroner’s photos are not disclosable except in limited cases. When a 
government entity takes possession of these sensitive records, it has a duty to take care not to 
disseminate them in a way that violates the expectation of privacy a family has in ensuring their 
loved ones’ gruesome death photos are not shared, lacking a legitimate public interest in the 
disclosure of those photos.  
 
However, recent events in California have shown that some government employees have acted 
with impunity in capturing and sharing tragic photos in a salacious manner. A few days after the 
helicopter crash that killed Kobe Bryant and eight others, the Los Angeles Times reported that a 
Los Angeles County sheriff’s deputy was showing gruesome photos taken at the scene of the 
accident to people in a bar. The Sheriff’s Department later determined that eight officers were 
ultimately involved in taking or obtaining photos from the scene without having a law 
enforcement purpose for doing so. These photos were only obtained by individuals by virtue of 
their employment as first responders to an accident scene. 
 
First responders like police and coroners have special access to the scenes of accidents and other 
deadly incidents by virtue of their public employment. While these employees have many 
legitimate reasons to capture images of a scene, the act of obtaining these photos for purely 
personal purposes is improper.  
 
AB 2655 (Gipson), Chapter 219, makes it a misdemeanor for a first responder, as defined, 
operating under color of authority, to use an electronic at the scene of an accident or crime to 
capture the image of a deceased person for any purpose other than an official law 
enforcement purpose or for a genuine public interest. Specifically, this new law: 
• Requires an agency that employs first responders on January 1, 2021 to notify its 
employees who are first responders of the prohibition imposed by this new law. 
 
• Makes it a crime for a first responder, operating under color of authority, who responds to 
the scene of an accident or crime to capture the photographic image of a deceased person 
by any means, including, but not limited to, by use of a personal electronic device or a 
device belonging to their employing agency, for any purpose other than an official law 
enforcement purpose or a genuine public interest is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable 
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by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) per violation. 
 
• Creates the right to obtain a warrant when the property or things to be seized consists of 
evidence that tends to show that a violation of this new law has occurred or is occurring. 
Provides that evidence to be seized pursuant to this new law shall be limited to evidence 
of a violation of the prohibitions imposed by this new law and shall not include evidence 
of a violation of a departmental rule or guideline that is not a public offense under 
California law. 
 
• Defines, for purposes of this new law, “first responder” to mean a state or local peace 
officer, paramedic, emergency medical technician, rescue service personnel, emergency 
manager, firefighter, coroner, or employee of a coroner. 
 
 
SB 1123 (Chang) – Elder and dependent adult abuse 
 
Consistency in the application of the law is a desirable quality. It promotes fairness and equitable 
treatment. Currently, elder and dependent adult abuse is defined in the Penal Code as “physical 
abuse, neglect, financial abuse, abandonment, isolation, abduction, or other treatment resulting in 
physical harm, pain or mental suffering; or the deprivation by a care custodian of goods or 
services that are necessary to avoid physical harm or mental suffering.” Each of those terms has 
a specific definition in the Welfare and Institutions Code, but the penal code does not cross-
reference those definitions.   
 
SB 1123 (Chang) Chapter 247, Clarifies the definition of elder and dependent adult 
abuse and requires law enforcement agencies to update their policy manuals with the new 
definition. Specifically, this new law: 
 
• Clarifies, in the context of elder and dependent adult abuse, definitions of the terms 
“abandonment,” “abduction,” “financial abuse,” “goods and services necessary to 
avoid physical harm or mental suffering,” “isolation,” “mental suffering,” “neglect,” 
and “physical abuse” by cross-referencing the Welfare and Institutions Code.  
 
• Requires every local law enforcement agency, when the agency next undertakes the 
policy revision process, to revise or include in the portion of its policy manual 
relating to elder and dependent adult abuse, if that policy manual exists, the updated, 
cross-referenced definition of elder and dependent adult abuse.   
 
 
SB 1196 (Umberg) – Price gouging 
 
Current law makes it unlawful for retailers and service providers to price gouge during a 30 day 
period (180 days for reconstruction services) after a declared state of emergency. “Price 
gouging” is increasing the price of specified goods and services by more than 10% above the 
price of those goods and services were offered for prior to the declaration of emergency. The 
provisions of the price gouging statute are triggered when a state of emergency has been declared 
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by the President of the United States, the Governor, or officials at a county or municipal level, as 
specified. 
 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, sellers have been buying vitally needed consumer goods and 
personal protective equipment, thus depleting store shelves, and then selling those essential 
goods for extortionately high prices, online as well as in traditional retail stores. Many of these 
sellers were not offering these goods for sale prior to the pandemic and therefore are not covered 
by the existing price gouging law. 
 
SB 1196 (Umberg), Chapter 339, includes a person or entity that was not selling specified 
goods and services prior to the declaration of an emergency within the scope of the crime of 
price gouging. Specifically, this new bill: 
 
• Includes pandemic or epidemic disease outbreak in the lists of events that can trigger a 
declaration of emergency. 
 
• Specifies that a person, business, or other entity may not sell specified goods and services 
for a price of more than 10% greater than the price charged by that person for those 
goods or services immediately prior to the proclamation or declaration of emergency, or 
prior to a date set in the proclamation or declaration. 
 
• State that if a person, contractor, business, or other entity did not charge a price for the 
goods or services immediately prior to the proclamation or declaration of emergency, it 
may not charge a price that is more than 50% greater than the seller's existing costs, as 
specified. 
 
• Allows the Governor or the Legislature to extend the time frame for price gouging 
beyond 30 days without limit, while continuing to specify that each extension of the price 







AB 1506 (McCarty) – Police use of force 
 
In California alone, there have been almost 800 fatal shootings by police since 2015, but 
only a small number of independent investigations have been conducted. While the vast 
majority of law enforcement officers, from county prosecutors to police officers, act in 
accordance with appropriate professional and ethical standards, the current process of 
local district attorneys investigating local police has the possibility for bias and conflicts of 
interest.  
 
In March 2015, the Obama Administration released the “President’s Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing,” with recommendations and action items to strengthen community 
policing and trust among law enforcement and the communities they serve. The task force 
encouraged policies that mandate the use of external and independent prosecutors in cases 
of police use-of-force resulting in death, officer-involved shootings resulting in injury or 
death, or in-custody deaths. 
 
AB 1506 (McCarty), Chapter 326, provides that a state prosecutor shall conduct an 
investigation of any officer-involved shooting that resulted in the death of an unarmed 
civilian, as specified. It directs the Attorney General, beginning July 1, 2023, to 
operate a Police Practices Division within the Department of Justice (DOJ), to, upon 
request of a local law enforcement agency, review the use of deadly force policies of 
that law enforcement agency. Specifically, this new law: 
 
• Specifies that a state prosecutor shall investigate incidents of an officer-involved shooting 
resulting in the death of an unarmed civilian. 
 
• States that the Attorney General is the state prosecutor unless otherwise specified or 
named. 
 
• Specifies that a state prosecutor is authorized to do all of the following: 
 
o Investigate and gather facts in incidents involving a shooting by a peace officer 
that results in the death of an unarmed civilian; 
 
o For all investigations conducted, prepare and submit a written report; and, 
 
o And, if criminal charges against the involved officer are found to be warranted, 
initiate and prosecute a criminal action against the officer. 
 
• State that beginning on July 1, 2023, the Attorney General shall operate a Police Practices 
Division within DOJ to, upon request of a local law enforcement agency, review the use 





• Specify that the Police Practices Division shall make specific and customized 
recommendations to any law enforcement agency that requests a review, based on those 
policies identified as recommended best practices. 
 




AB 1950 (Kamlager) – Probation: length of term 
 
California’s adult supervised probation population is around 548,000 – the largest of any state in 
the nation, more than twice the size of the state’s prison population, almost four times larger than 
its jail population and about six times larger than its parole population. 
 
A paper called Paradox of Probation: Community Supervision in the Age of Mass Incarceration 
discussed concerns that more and higher levels of probation supervision can lead increased 
involvement in the criminal justice system for the individuals being supervised on probation.  
Scholars argue that the enhanced restrictions and monitoring of probation set probationers up to 
fail, with mandatory meetings, home visits, regular drug testing, and program compliance 
incompatible with the instability of probationers’ everyday lives. In addition, the enhanced 
monitoring by probation officers (and in some cases, law enforcement as well) makes the 
detection of minor violations and offenses more likely. 
 
Research by the California Budget & Policy Center shows that probation services, such as 
mental healthcare and addiction treatment, are most effective during the first 18 months of 
supervision. Research also indicates that providing increased supervision and services earlier 
reduces an individual’s likelihood to recidivate. 
AB 1950 (Kamlager), Chapter 328, specifies that a court may not impose a term of 
probation longer than two years for a felony conviction and one year for a misdemeanor 
conviction, except as specified. Specifically, this new law. 
• Limits the probation term to one year for misdemeanor offenses. Does not apply to any 
offense that includes a specific probation term in statute. 
 
• Limits the probation term to two years for a felony offenses. 
 
• Provides that the two-year probation limit does not apply to offenses defined by law as 
violent felonies, or to an offense that includes a specific probation term within its 
provisions.  
 
• Provides that the two-year probation limit does not apply to a felony conviction for grand 
theft from an employer, embezzlement, or theft by false pretenses, if the total value of 




AB 2014 (Maienschein) – Medical misconduct: misuse of sperm, ova, or embryos 
 
The statute of limitations requires a prosecution to be initiated within a certain period of time 
after the commission of a crime. A prosecution is initiated by filing an indictment or information, 
filing a complaint, certifying a case to superior court, or issuing an arrest or bench warrant. The 
amount of time in which a prosecuting agency may charge an alleged defendant varies based on 
the crime. In general, the limitations period is related to the seriousness of the offense as 
reflected in the length of punishment established by the Legislature. There are, however, some 
statutes of limitations not necessarily based on the seriousness of the offense. The Legislature 
has acknowledged that some crimes by their design are difficult to detect and may be 
immediately undiscoverable upon their completion.   
 
In the 1990’s, two doctors were charged with stealing embryos and eggs belonging to women 
who sought fertility treatment at the University of California Irvine Center for Reproductive 
Health and implanting them in other women without the consent of the donors. That case, which 
involved dozens of victims, caused this Legislature to introduce legislation which criminalized 
the misuse of sperm, embryo and ova. Although the crimes are rare, the offense of using or 
implanting reproductive material in a manner that is inconsistent with the will of the donor is one 
that, by its very nature, is difficult to detect at the time the offense occurs. The typical offense is 
not likely to be discovered until a person discovers a previously-unknown familial relationship 
through genetic testing. Such testing may not occur for years or even decades after the moment 
when a doctor or medical professional fraudulently implanted sperm or an embryo without the 
consent of the donor. 
 
AB 2014 (Maienschein) Chapter 244, extends the statute of limitations for criminal 
offenses involving the misuse of sperm, ova, or embryos in assisted reproduction 
technology. Specifically, this new law: 
 
• Extends the statute of limitations for a criminal offense relating to the misuse of 
sperm, ova, or embryos in assisted reproduction technology from three years from the 
time that the offense occurred, to one year from the discovery of the offense.   
 
• Specifies that the statute of limitations proposed by this bill would only apply to 
offenses committed on or after January 1, 2021, and to crimes for which the statute of 




AB 2321 (Jones-Sawyer) – Juvenile court records: access 
 
In 2000, Congress created the U-Visa and T-Visa classifications with its passage of the Victims 
of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (VTVPA). This law affords immigrants who are 
victims of a common or human trafficking crime with the opportunity to obtain an immigrant 
visa upon cooperation with law enforcement in an investigation of an underlying crime. The 
creation of the U- and T-Visas encourage immigrants to report crimes and receive protection 




As a part of obtaining a U- or T-visa, a person must get certification by a prosecutor of 
helpfulness. Prosecutors must sign under penalty of perjury that a victim was helpful in a 
qualifying case. Without access to the files for review, prosecutors are unable to refresh their 
recollection or make an initial determination regarding helpfulness.  
 
AB 2321 (Jones-Sawyer), Chapter 137, permits a prosecutor or a court to access sealed 
juvenile records for the limited purpose of certifying victim helpfulness in an application for 
a U-Visa or a T-Visa. Specifically, this new law: 
 
• States that a record that was sealed pursuant to this section that was generated in 
connection with the investigation, prosecution, or adjudication of a qualifying offense as 
defined may be accessed by a judge or prosecutor for the limited purpose of processing a 
request of a victim or victim’s family member to certify victim helpfulness on the Form 
I-918 Supplement B certification or Form I-914 Supplement B declaration. Further states 
that the information obtained shall not be disseminated to other agencies or individuals, 
except as necessary to certify victim helpfulness on the Form I-918 Supplement B 
certification or Form I-914 Supplement B declaration, and under no circumstances shall it 
be used to support the imposition of penalties, detention, or other sanctions upon an 
individual. 
 
• Provides that when a new petition has been filed against the minor in juvenile court and 
the issue of competency is raised, by the probation department, the prosecuting attorney, 
counsel for the minor, and the court for the purpose of assessing the minor’s competency 
in the proceedings on the new petition. Further states that access, inspection, or utilization 
of the sealed records is limited to any prior competency evaluations submitted to the 
court, whether ordered by the court or not, all reports concerning remediation efforts and 
success, all court findings and orders relating to the minor’s competency, and any other 
evidence submitted to the court for consideration in determining the minor’s competency, 
including, but not limited to, school records and other test results. States that the 
information obtained pursuant to this subparagraph shall not be disseminated to any other 
person or agency except as necessary to evaluate the minor’s competency or provide 
remediation services, and shall not be used to support the imposition of penalties, 
detention, or other sanctions on the minor. Also provides that access to the sealed record 
under this subparagraph shall not be construed as a modification of the court’s order 
dismissing the petition and sealing the record in the case. 
 
 
AB 2425 (Stone, M.) – Juvenile police records 
 
Previous legislation (SB 1038 (Leno), Chapter 249, Statutes of 2014) provided a process for 
automatic juvenile record sealing (i.e. without a petition from the minor) in cases involving 
satisfactorily-completed informal supervision or probation, except in cases involving specified 
serious or violent offenses where the juvenile was 14 years or older at the time of the offense and 
the offense was not dismissed or reduced to a non-serious or non-violent offense. (Welf. & Inst. 
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Code, § 786.) The sealing of delinquency records is an important factor in reducing recidivism 
and opening doors to jobs and education for many of California’s youth. 
 
Current law does not distinguish between a record of a youth who is counseled and released, and 
a youth who avoids arrest because they no longer fall within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 
The law also fails to distinguish between a juvenile police record that documents a diversion 
program referral, and a record that documents an arrest and subsequent referral to probation or 
the district attorney. Additionally, current law allows other law enforcement agencies to obtain a 
complete copy of the juvenile police record without notice or the consent of the youth who is the 
subject of the record.  
 
AB 2425 (Stone, M.), Chapter 330, prohibits the release of information by a law 
enforcement, social worker, or probation agency when a juvenile has participated in or 
completed a diversion program. Specifically, this new law:  
 
• Provides that a probation department shall seal the arrest and other records in its custody 
relating to a juvenile’s arrest and referral and participation in a diversion or supervision 
program under both of the following circumstances: 
 
o Upon satisfactory completion of a program of diversion or supervision to which a 
juvenile is referred by the probation officer in lieu of the filing of a petition to 
adjudge the juvenile a ward of the juvenile court, including a program of informal 
supervision pursuant to Welf. & Inst. Code Section 654. 
 
o Upon satisfactory completion of a program of diversion or supervision to which a 
juvenile is referred by the prosecutor in lieu of the filing of a petition to adjudge 
the juvenile a ward of the juvenile court, including a program of informal 
supervision pursuant to Welf. & Inst. Code Section 654. 
 
• States that the probation department shall notify the arresting law enforcement agency to 
seal the arrest records and the arresting law enforcement agency shall seal the records in 
its custody relating to the arrest no later than 60 days from the date of notification by the 
probation department. Upon sealing, the arresting law enforcement agency shall notify 
the probation department that the records have been sealed. Within 30 days from receipt 
of notification by the arresting law enforcement agency that the records have been sealed 
pursuant to this section, the probation department shall notify the minor in writing that 
their record has been sealed pursuant to this section. If records have not been sealed 
pursuant this section, the written notice from the probation department shall inform the 
minor of their ability to petition the court directly to seal their arrest and other related 
records. 
 
• Provides that upon sealing of the records pursuant to this section, the arrest or offense 
giving rise to any of the circumstances, as specified, shall be deemed not to have 
occurred and the individual may respond accordingly to any inquiry, application, or 




• States that for the records relating to the circumstances, as specified, the probation 
department shall issue notice as follows:  
 
o The probation department shall  notify a public or private agency operating a 
diversion program to which the juvenile has been referred under these 
circumstances to seal records in the program operator’s custody relating to the 
arrest or referral and the participation of the juvenile in the diversion or 
supervision program, and the operator of the program shall seal the records in its 
custody relating to the juvenile’s arrest or referral and participation in the program 
no later than 60 days from the date of notification by the probation department. 
Upon sealing, the public or private agency operating a diversion program shall 
notify the probation department that the records have been sealed. 
 
o An individual who receives notice from the probation department that the 
individual has not satisfactorily completed the diversion program and that the 
record has not been sealed pursuant to this section may petition the juvenile court 
for review of the decision in a hearing in which the program participant may seek 
to demonstrate, and the court may determine, that the individual has met the 
satisfactory completion requirement and is eligible for the sealing of the record by 
the probation department, the arresting law enforcement agency, and the program 
operator under the provisions of this section. 
 
• Provides that any record, that has been sealed pursuant to this section may be accessed, 
inspected, or utilized by the prosecuting attorney in order to meet a statutory or 
constitutional obligation to disclose favorable or exculpatory evidence to a defendant in a 
criminal case in which the prosecuting attorney has reason to believe that access to the 
record is necessary to meet the disclosure obligation. 
 
• States that a prosecuting attorney shall not use information contained in a record sealed 
pursuant to this section for any purpose other than those permitted by this law. 
 
• States that once the case at issue has been closed and is no longer subject to review on 




AB 2512 (Stone, M.) – Death Penalty: person with an intellectual disability 
 
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court ruled that it is unconstitutional to execute someone 
with an intellectual disability. (Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536 U.S. 304, 321 (Atkins).) The Court 
left it up to the states to “‘develop[] appropriate ways’” to ensure that intellectually disabled 
defendants are not sentenced to death. (Id. at p. 317, quoting Ford v. Wainwright (1986) 477 
U.S. 399, 416-417.) The following year, the Legislature added Penal Code section 1376 to 
implement this decision. The intellectual disability standard set forth in the statute was derived 
from the two clinical definitions referenced by the Court in Atkins. (In re Hawthorne (2005) 35 
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Cal.4th 40, 44, 47-48.) Unfortunately, despite the fact that clinical standards have changed over 
the years, the statute has not been updated.  
 
Regarding post-conviction relief, California Supreme Court guidance provides that a claim of 
intellectual disability should be raised by a petition for writ of habeas corpus. By its terms, the 
standards and procedures set forth in Penal Code section 1376 apply only to pre-conviction 
proceedings. However, our state High Court has concluded that post-conviction proceedings 
should “track[] section 1376 as closely as logic and practicality permit….” (In re Hawthorne, 
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 47.) 
 
AB 2512 (Stone), Chapter 331, authorizes a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of 
death to apply for an order directing that a hearing to determine intellectual disability be 
conducted as part of a habeas corpus petition and revises the definition of intellectual 
disability. Specifically, this new law:   
 
• States that the United States Supreme Court has recognized that it is unconstitutional 
to execute a person with an intellectual disability. It is the intent of the Legislature 
that California adopt the professional medical community’s definition and 
understanding of intellectual disability. It is the further intent of the Legislature that 
individuals with intellectual disabilities be accurately and quickly identified to avoid 
protracted and unnecessary litigation. 
 
• Revises the definition of "intellectual disability" to mean the condition of 
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with 
deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested before the end of the developmental 
period, as defined by clinical standards. 
 
• Defines "prima facie showing of intellectual disability" to mean that the defendant's 
allegation of intellectual disability is based on the type of evidence typically relied on 
by a qualified expert in diagnosing intellectual disability, as defined in current clinical 
standards, or when a qualified expert provides a declaration diagnosing the defendant 
as intellectually disabled. 
 
• Requires the court to order a hearing to determine whether the defendant is a person 
with an intellectual disability upon a prima facie showing, as defined. 
 
• Authorizes a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of death to apply for an order 
directing that a hearing to determine intellectual disability be conducted as part of a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  
 
• Provides that when the claim of intellectual disability is raised in a petition for habeas 
corpus and a petitioner makes a prima facie showing of intellectual disability, the 
reviewing court shall issue an order to show cause if the petitioner has met the prima 




• Specifies that the petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the petitioner is a person with an intellectual disability.  
 
• Provides that the state may present its case regarding the issue of whether the 
petitioner is a person with an intellectual disability. Each party may offer rebuttal 
evidence. 
 
• Provides that during an evidentiary hearing under the habeas corpus provisions, an 
expert may testify about the contents of out-of-court statements, including 
documentary evidence and statements from witnesses when those types of statements 
are accepted by the medical community as relevant to a diagnosis of intellectual 
disability if the expert relied upon these statements as the basis for their opinion.  
 
• Prohibits changing or adjusting the results of a test measuring intellectual functioning 
based on race, ethnicity, national origin, or socioeconomic status. 
 
 
AB 2542 (Kalra) – Criminal procedure:  discrimination 
 
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court issued a landmark ruling on the issue of racial bias and 
prejudice in the American Court System – McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) 481 U.S. 279 
(McCleskey). The McCleskey opinion has had far-reaching effects on a wide array of equal 
protection claims. “The precedent impairs constitutional challenges based on widespread racial 
disparities not just in capital sentencing, but in the criminal-justice system more widely; it 
requires defendants to prove discrimination on a specific basis, providing clear evidence that 
they were explicitly targeted because of their race. If police officers, prosecutors, judges, or 
others don’t openly acknowledge their own prejudices, defendants face a prohibitively high bar 
fighting for their Fourteenth Amendment rights in court.” (Neklason, The “Death Penalty’s Dred 
Scott” Lives on, The Atlantic (June 14, 2019).) 
 
AB 2542 (Kalra), Chapter 317, prohibits the state from seeking or obtaining a 
conviction or sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin. Specifically, this 
new law:   
 
• Prohibits the state from seeking or obtaining a criminal conviction or seeking, 
obtaining, or imposing a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.  
• Applies prospectively in cases in which a judgment has not been entered prior to 
January 1, 2021. 
• States that a violation of this prohibition is established if the defendant proves, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, any of the following: 
o The judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the 
case, an expert witness, or juror exhibited bias or animus towards the 
defendant because of the defendant's race, ethnicity, or national origin; 
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o During the defendant’s trial, in court and during the proceedings, the judge, an 
attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert 
witness, or juror, used racially discriminatory language about the defendant's 
race, ethnicity, or national origin, except as specified, or otherwise exhibited 
bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant's race, 
ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful; 
o The defendant was charged or convicted of a more serious offense than 
defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins who commit similar 
offenses and are similarly situated and the evidence establishes that the 
prosecution more frequently sought or obtained convictions for more serious 
offenses against people who share the defendant's race, ethnicity, or national 
origin in the county where the convictions were sought or obtained; 
o A longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was 
imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense, 
and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for that 
offense on people that share the defendant's race, ethnicity, or national origin 
than on defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins in the county 
where the sentence was imposed; or, 
o A longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was 
imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense, 
and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for the 
same offense on defendants in cases with victims of one race, ethnicity, or 
national origin than in cases with victims of other races, ethnicities, or 
national origins in the county where the sentence was imposed. 
• States that a defendant may file a motion in the trial court, or if judgement has been 
imposed, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate the 
conviction or sentence in a court of competent jurisdiction alleging a violation of the 
prohibition. 
• States that if a motion is filed in the trial court and the defendant makes a prima facie 
showing of a violation, the court shall hold a hearing. 
• Provides that at the hearing, evidence may be presented by either party, including but 
not limited to, statistical evidence, aggregate data, expert testimony, and the sworn 
testimony of witnesses. The court may also appoint an independent expert. 
• States that the defendant shall have the burden of proving the violation by a 
preponderance of the evidence and at the conclusion of the hearing, the court shall 
make findings on the record. 
• Provides that a defendant may file a motion requesting disclosure of all evidence 
relevant to a potential violation of the prohibition that is in the possession or control 
of the state. Upon a showing of good cause, and if the records are not privileged, the 
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court shall order the records to be released. Upon a showing of good cause, the court 
may permit the prosecution to redact information prior to disclosure. 
• States that, notwithstanding any other law, except for an initiative approved by the 
voters, if the court finds by a preponderance of evidence a violation of the 
prohibition, the court shall impose a remedy specific to the violation found from the 
following list of remedies: 
o Before a judgment has been entered, the court may reseat a juror removed by 
use of a peremptory challenge, declare a mistrial if requested by the 
defendant, discharge the jury panel and empanel a new jury, or, in the interests 
of justice, the court may dismiss enhancements, special circumstances, or 
special allegations, or reduce one or more charges; 
o When judgment has been entered: 
§ If the court finds that the conviction was sought or obtained in 
violation of the prohibition, the court shall vacate the conviction and 
sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings;  
§ If the court finds the violation was based only on the defendant being 
charged or convicted of a more serious offense than defendants of 
other races, ethnicities, or national origins, and the court has the ability 
to rectify the violation by modifying the judgment, the court shall 
vacate the judgment and sentence, find that the conviction is legally 
invalid, and modify the judgment to impose an appropriate remedy for 
the violation that occurred, except that the court shall not impose a 
sentence greater than that previously imposed; and, 
§ If the court finds that only the sentence was sought, obtained, or 
imposed in violation of the prohibition, the court shall vacate the 
sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and impose a new sentence no 
greater than the sentence previously imposed. 
• Prohibits imposition of the death penalty where the court finds a violation of the 
prohibition.  
• Provides that the remedies available under this provision do not foreclose any other 
remedies available under the United States Constitution, the California Constitution, 
or any other law. 
• Specifies that these provisions apply to adjudications and dispositions in the juvenile 
delinquency system. 
• Provides that these provisions do not prevent the prosecution of hate crimes. 
• Defines "more frequently sought or obtained" or "more frequently imposed" as 
meaning that statistical evidence or aggregate data demonstrate a significant 
difference in seeking or obtaining convictions or in imposing sentences comparing 
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individuals who have committed similar offenses and are similarly situated and the 
prosecution cannot establish race-neutral reasons for the disparity. 
• Defines "prima facie showing" as meaning that the defendant produces facts that, if 
true, establish a substantial likelihood that a violation of the prohibition occurred. 
“Substantial likelihood” requires more than a mere possibility, but less than a 
standard of more likely than not.  
• Defines "racially discriminatory language" as meaning language that, to an objective 
observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias, including, but not limited to, 
racially charged or racially coded language, language that compares the defendant to 
an animal, or language that references the defendant's physical appearance, culture, 
ethnicity or national origin. Evidence that particular words or images are used 
exclusively or disproportionately in cases where the defendant is of a specific race, 
ethnicity, or national origin is relevant to determining whether language is 
discriminatory. 
• Defines “state” as including the Attorney General, a district attorney, or a city 
prosecutor. 
• Provides that a defendant may share a race, ethnicity, or national origin with more 
than one group and may aggregate data among groups to demonstrate a violation of 
the prohibition. 
• Specifies that a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted after a judgment has been 
entered based on evidence of a violation of the prohibition if the judgment was 
entered on or after January 1, 2021. 
• States that a petition raising such a claim for the first time, or on the basis of new 
discovery provided by the state or other new evidence that could not have been 
previously known by the petitioner with due diligence, shall not be deemed a 
successive or abusive petition. 
• Provides that if a petitioner already has a habeas corpus petition pending in state 
court, but it has not yet been decided, the petitioner may amend the existing petition 
with a claim of a violation of the prohibition. 
• Requires the petition to state if the petitioner requests appointment of counsel and the 
court to appoint counsel if the petitioner cannot afford counsel and either the petition 
alleges facts that would establish a violation of the prohibition or the State Public 
Defender requests counsel be appointed. Newly appointed counsel may amend a 
petition filed before their appointment. 
• Requires the court to review the petition and if the court determines the petitioner has 
made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the court shall issue an order to 
show cause why relief shall not be granted and hold an evidentiary hearing, unless the 
state declines to show cause.  
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• Provides that the defendant shall appear at the hearing by video unless counsel 
indicates that their presence is needed. 
• States that if the court determines that the petitioner has not established a prima facie 
showing of entitlement to relief, the court shall state the factual and legal basis for its 
conclusion on the record or issue a written order detailing the factual and legal basis 
for its conclusion. 
 
• Makes conforming changes to allow a person who is no longer in custody to vacate a 
conviction or sentence based on a violation of the prohibition. 
 
• Contains a severability clause. 
 
• Makes a number of Legislative findings and declarations including that it is the intent 
of the Legislature to eliminate racial bias from California's criminal justice system 
because racism in any form or amount, at any stage of a criminal trial, is intolerable, 
inimical to a fair criminal justice system, is a miscarriage of justice under Article VI 




SB 203 (Bradford) – Juveniles: custodial interrogation 
 
“Miranda warnings” are a series of admonitions that are typically given by police prior to 
interrogating a suspect of a crime. The purpose of Miranda warnings is to advise people who 
have been arrested of their constitutional right against self-incrimination. They are the product of 
the landmark Supreme Court decision Miranda v. Arizona. In deciding that case, the Supreme 
Court imposed specific, constitutional requirements for the advice an officer must provide prior 
to engaging in custodial interrogation and held that statements taken without these warnings are 
inadmissible against the defendant in a criminal case. Put simply, “Miranda warnings” are meant 
to inform people who are arrested of their constitutional right not to be a witness against 
themselves. Police are not required to speak a specific set of words but generally must convey 
that the person has the right not to answer any questions, that anything the person does say can 
be used against them as evidence in a court of law, that the person has the right to an attorney, 
that if the person cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed at no cost, and that the person 
has the right to invoke these rights at any point in time during questioning.   
 
A growing body of research indicates that adolescents are less capable of understanding their 
constitutional rights than their adult counterparts, and also that they are more prone to falsely 
confessing to a crime they did not commit. In brief, research suggests that adolescents are more 
impulsive, are more easily influenced by others (especially by figures of authority), are more 
sensitive to rewards (especially immediate rewards), and are less able to weigh in on the long-
term consequences of their actions than their adult counterparts. The context of custodial 
interrogation is believed to exacerbate these risks and there have been numerous studies showing 
that false confessions are disproportionately obtained from youthful suspects.  For that reason, 
this Legislature has previously enacted into law additional procedural protections for minors who 
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are under the age of 16.   
 
SB 203 (Bradford), Chapter 335, provides for expanded protections for minors ages 16 
and 17 prior to custodial interrogation by law enforcement. Specifically, this new law: 
 
• Requires that prior to any custodial interrogation and before the waiver of any 
Miranda rights, a youth of 17 years or younger must consult with legal counsel in 
person, by telephone, or by video conference. 
 
• Prohibits the waiver of such consultation with legal counsel. 
 
• Requires the court to consider a lack of consultation with legal counsel for the 
purposes of determining the admissibility of any statements made to law enforcement, 
as well as in determining the credibility of any officer who willfully failed to comply 
with the consult requirement. 
 
• Eliminates the sunset date of January 1, 2025 for similar protections that applied only 
to minors under the age of 16, making them permanent.   
 
• Eliminates the requirement that the Governor convene a panel of experts to examine 
the effects and outcomes of requiring minors under the age of 16 to consult with 








SB 1276 (Rubio, S.) – The Comprehensive Statewide Domestic Violence Program 
 
The Legislature made findings that the problem of domestic violence is of serious and increasing 
magnitude; and that existing domestic violence services are underfunded and that some areas of 
the state are unserved or underserved. These structural issues have been compounded since 
March 2020, when impacts to fundraising and volunteering began due to COVID-19. At the 
same time, reports of incidents of domestic violence began to rise.   
 
Under existing law, a “domestic violence shelter service provider” is “a victim services provider 
that operates an established system of services providing safe and confidential emergency 
housing on a 24-hour basis for victims of domestic violence and their children, including, but not 
limited to, hotel or motel arrangements, haven, and safe houses” To receive state funding, 
existing law requires that for these centers to receive state dollars, they must show a cash or an 
in-kind match of at least 10 percent of the funds received under the law.  
 
As a result of the stay at home orders, and limitations on public gatherings which began in March 
2020, DVSSPs have been unable to host traditional fundraising events. Additionally, the current 
economic recession has negatively impacted giving by donors. During the COVID-19 crises 
response, the Governor temporarily suspended the matching requirement in emergency 
regulations. 
 
SB 1276 (Rubio), Chapter 249, eliminates the requirement that state funding be matched 
by 10 percent to qualify a local domestic violence shelter service provider with funding 







SB 1123 (Chang) – Elder and dependent adult abuse 
 
Consistency in the application of the law is a desirable quality. It promotes fairness and equitable 
treatment. Currently, elder and dependent adult abuse is defined in the Penal Code as “physical 
abuse, neglect, financial abuse, abandonment, isolation, abduction, or other treatment resulting in 
physical harm, pain or mental suffering; or the deprivation by a care custodian of goods or 
services that are necessary to avoid physical harm or mental suffering.” Each of those terms has 
a specific definition in the Welfare and Institutions Code, but the penal code does not cross-
reference those definitions.   
 
SB 1123 (Chang) Chapter 247, Clarifies the definition of elder and dependent adult 
abuse and requires law enforcement agencies to update their policy manuals with the new 
definition. Specifically, this new law: 
 
• Clarifies, in the context of elder and dependent adult abuse, definitions of the terms 
“abandonment,” “abduction,” “financial abuse,” “goods and services necessary to 
avoid physical harm or mental suffering,” “isolation,” “mental suffering,” “neglect,” 
and “physical abuse” by cross-referencing the Welfare and Institutions Code.   
 
• Requires every local law enforcement agency, when the agency next undertakes the 
policy revision process, to revise or include in the portion of its policy manual 
relating to elder and dependent adult abuse, if that policy manual exists, the updated, 








AB 1927 (Boerner-Horvath) – Witness testimony in sexual assault cases:  inadmissibility in 
a separate prosecution 
 
Existing law provides for the granting of immunity upon the petition of the prosecution and a 
finding by the court that such immunity is in the public interest. A victim or witness may be 
granted immunity for their testimony in a felony prosecution through a process known as 
“compelled testimony.” In that procedure, the victim or witness must first formally refuse to 
testify or provide evidence, invoking the rationale that doing so may incriminate them. The court 
can then “compel” the person to testify, granting immunity from prosecution for their statements 
and evidence in the process. A grant of immunity means that the prosecution cannot use the 
witness’ testimony again them in any future prosecution. 
 
The compelled testimony procedure can be traumatic and complicated for victims and witnesses, 
who have often already been traumatized by virtue of being the witness to, or victim of, a sexual 
assault. Reports have shown that sexual assaults often go unreported and some believe that the 
procedure of compelled testimony may be a factor in deterring people from coming forward.  
This may be particularly true when drugs or alcohol are being consumed at or around the time of 
a sexual assault, such as one that takes place at a house party or on or around a college campus.  
 
AB 1927 (Boerner Horvath), Chapter 241, provides that the testimony of a victim or 
witness in a felony prosecution for specified sex crimes that the victim or witness, at or 
around the time of crime, unlawfully possessed or used a controlled substance or alcohol 
inadmissible in a separate prosecution of that victim or witness to prove illegal 
possession or use of that controlled substance or alcohol.  Specifically, this new law: 
 
• States that the testimony of a victim or witness in a felony prosecution for assault or 
burglary with the intent to commit specified sex crimes, sexual battery, rape, statutory 
rape, sodomy, oral copulation, lewd or lascivious acts, sexual penetration, that the 
victim or witness, at or around the time of the sex crime unlawfully possessed or used 
a control substance or alcohol is inadmissible in a separate prosecution of that victim 
or witness to prove illegal possession or use of that controlled substance or alcohol. 
 
• Specifies that evidence that the testifying witness unlawfully possessed or used a 
controlled substance or alcohol is not excluded from use in the felony prosecution for 
a violation or attempted violation of specified sex crimes. 
 
• Specifies that evidence that a witness received use immunity for testimony is not 








AB 2425 (Stone, M.) – Juvenile police records 
 
Previous legislation (SB 1038 (Leno), Chapter 249, Statutes of 2014) provided a process for 
automatic juvenile record sealing (i.e. without a petition from the minor) in cases involving 
satisfactorily-completed informal supervision or probation, except in cases involving specified 
serious or violent offenses where the juvenile was 14 years or older at the time of the offense and 
the offense was not dismissed or reduced to a non-serious or non-violent offense. (Welf. & Inst. 
Code, § 786.) The sealing of delinquency records is an important factor in reducing recidivism 
and opening doors to jobs and education for many of California’s youth. 
 
Current law does not distinguish between a record of a youth who is counseled and released, and 
a youth who avoids arrest because they no longer fall within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 
The law also fails to distinguish between a juvenile police record that documents a diversion 
program referral, and a record that documents an arrest and subsequent referral to probation or 
the district attorney. Additionally, current law allows other law enforcement agencies to obtain a 
complete copy of the juvenile police record without notice or the consent of the youth who is the 
subject of the record.  
 
AB 2425 (Stone, M.), Chapter 330, prohibits the release of information by a law 
enforcement, social worker, or probation agency when a juvenile has participated in or 
completed a diversion program. Specifically, this new law:  
 
• Provides that a probation department shall seal the arrest and other records in its custody 
relating to a juvenile’s arrest and referral and participation in a diversion or supervision 
program under both of the following circumstances: 
 
o Upon satisfactory completion of a program of diversion or supervision to which a 
juvenile is referred by the probation officer in lieu of the filing of a petition to 
adjudge the juvenile a ward of the juvenile court, including a program of informal 
supervision pursuant to Welf. & Inst. Code Section 654. 
 
o Upon satisfactory completion of a program of diversion or supervision to which a 
juvenile is referred by the prosecutor in lieu of the filing of a petition to adjudge 
the juvenile a ward of the juvenile court, including a program of informal 
supervision pursuant to Welf. & Inst. Code Section 654. 
 
• States that the probation department shall notify the arresting law enforcement agency to 
seal the arrest records and the arresting law enforcement agency shall seal the records in 
its custody relating to the arrest no later than 60 days from the date of notification by the 
probation department. Upon sealing, the arresting law enforcement agency shall notify 
the probation department that the records have been sealed. Within 30 days from receipt 
of notification by the arresting law enforcement agency that the records have been sealed 
pursuant to this section, the probation department shall notify the minor in writing that 
their record has been sealed pursuant to this section. If records have not been sealed 
pursuant this section, the written notice from the probation department shall inform the 





• Provides that upon sealing of the records pursuant to this section, the arrest or offense 
giving rise to any of the circumstances, as specified, shall be deemed not to have 
occurred and the individual may respond accordingly to any inquiry, application, or 
process in which disclosure of this information is requested or sought. 
 
• States that for the records relating to the circumstances, as specified, the probation 
department shall issue notice as follows:  
 
o The probation department shall  notify a public or private agency operating a 
diversion program to which the juvenile has been referred under these 
circumstances to seal records in the program operator’s custody relating to the 
arrest or referral and the participation of the juvenile in the diversion or 
supervision program, and the operator of the program shall seal the records in its 
custody relating to the juvenile’s arrest or referral and participation in the program 
no later than 60 days from the date of notification by the probation department. 
Upon sealing, the public or private agency operating a diversion program shall 
notify the probation department that the records have been sealed. 
 
o An individual who receives notice from the probation department that the 
individual has not satisfactorily completed the diversion program and that the 
record has not been sealed pursuant to this section may petition the juvenile court 
for review of the decision in a hearing in which the program participant may seek 
to demonstrate, and the court may determine, that the individual has met the 
satisfactory completion requirement and is eligible for the sealing of the record by 
the probation department, the arresting law enforcement agency, and the program 
operator under the provisions of this section. 
 
• Provides that any record, that has been sealed pursuant to this section may be accessed, 
inspected, or utilized by the prosecuting attorney in order to meet a statutory or 
constitutional obligation to disclose favorable or exculpatory evidence to a defendant in a 
criminal case in which the prosecuting attorney has reason to believe that access to the 
record is necessary to meet the disclosure obligation. 
 
• States that a prosecuting attorney shall not use information contained in a record sealed 
pursuant to this section for any purpose other than those permitted by this law. 
 
• States that once the case at issue has been closed and is no longer subject to review on 









AB 2512 (Stone, M.) – Death Penalty: person with an intellectual disability 
 
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court ruled that it is unconstitutional to execute someone 
with an intellectual disability. (Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536 U.S. 304, 321 (Atkins).) The Court 
left it up to the states to “‘develop[] appropriate ways’” to ensure that intellectually disabled 
defendants are not sentenced to death. (Id. at p. 317, quoting Ford v. Wainwright (1986) 477 
U.S. 399, 416-417.) The following year, the Legislature added Penal Code section 1376 to 
implement this decision. The intellectual disability standard set forth in the statute was derived 
from the two clinical definitions referenced by the Court in Atkins. (In re Hawthorne (2005) 35 
Cal.4th 40, 44, 47-48.) Unfortunately, despite the fact that clinical standards have changed over 
the years, the statute has not been updated.  
 
Regarding post-conviction relief, California Supreme Court guidance provides that a claim of 
intellectual disability should be raised by a petition for writ of habeas corpus. By its terms, the 
standards and procedures set forth in Penal Code section 1376 apply only to pre-conviction 
proceedings. However, our state High Court has concluded that post-conviction proceedings 
should “track[] section 1376 as closely as logic and practicality permit….” (In re Hawthorne, 
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 47.) 
 
AB 2512 (Stone), Chapter 331, authorizes a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of 
death to apply for an order directing that a hearing to determine intellectual disability be 
conducted as part of a habeas corpus petition and revises the definition of intellectual 
disability. Specifically, this new law:   
 
• States that the United States Supreme Court has recognized that it is unconstitutional 
to execute a person with an intellectual disability. It is the intent of the Legislature 
that California adopt the professional medical community’s definition and 
understanding of intellectual disability. It is the further intent of the Legislature that 
individuals with intellectual disabilities be accurately and quickly identified to avoid 
protracted and unnecessary litigation. 
 
• Revises the definition of "intellectual disability" to mean the condition of 
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with 
deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested before the end of the developmental 
period, as defined by clinical standards. 
 
• Defines "prima facie showing of intellectual disability" to mean that the defendant's 
allegation of intellectual disability is based on the type of evidence typically relied on 
by a qualified expert in diagnosing intellectual disability, as defined in current clinical 
standards, or when a qualified expert provides a declaration diagnosing the defendant 
as intellectually disabled. 
 
• Requires the court to order a hearing to determine whether the defendant is a person 




• Authorizes a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of death to apply for an order 
directing that a hearing to determine intellectual disability be conducted as part of a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  
 
• Provides that when the claim of intellectual disability is raised in a petition for habeas 
corpus and a petitioner makes a prima facie showing of intellectual disability, the 
reviewing court shall issue an order to show cause if the petitioner has met the prima 
facie standard.  
 
• Specifies that the petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the petitioner is a person with an intellectual disability.  
 
• Provides that the state may present its case regarding the issue of whether the 
petitioner is a person with an intellectual disability. Each party may offer rebuttal 
evidence. 
 
• Provides that during an evidentiary hearing under the habeas corpus provisions, an 
expert may testify about the contents of out-of-court statements, including 
documentary evidence and statements from witnesses when those types of statements 
are accepted by the medical community as relevant to a diagnosis of intellectual 
disability if the expert relied upon these statements as the basis for their opinion.  
 
• Prohibits changing or adjusting the results of a test measuring intellectual functioning 






FINES AND FEES 
 
 
SB 1290 (Durazo) – Juveniles: costs 
 
Effective January 1, 2018, SB 190 (Mitchell), Chapter 678, Statutes of 2017, repealed county 
authority to charge a number of administrative fees to parents and guardians with a youth in the 
juvenile justice system and to persons ages 18 to 21 in the adult criminal adult justice system. 
“Before [SB 190] was passed, families of minors could be involuntarily charged for home 
detention fees, drug testing fees, representation fees, and electronic monitoring fees. A study by 
students of the University of California Berkeley School of Law demonstrated the harm of the 
previous law. While the fees were originally designed to recuperate high costs, the costs 
collected barely covered the costs of administering such fees. Further, families of color were 
disparately disadvantaged by the fees. The new policies set forth in S.B. 190 aimed to eliminate a 
source of financial harm to vulnerable families, support the reentry of youth leaving the juvenile 
justice system, and reduce the likelihood that youth will recidivate.” 
(Recent Court Decisions and Legislation Affecting Juveniles: Recent Court Decisions and 
Legislation Affecting Juveniles (2018) 22 U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol’y 179, 197-198 [footnotes 
omitted].) 
 
Although, since January 1, 2018, SB 190 prohibits counties from assessing new fees, it does not 
require counties to stop collecting previously assessed fees or to vacate existing fee judgments. 
Continuing to collect fees from system-involved youth and their families is a regressive, racially 
discriminatory, and financially unsound way for government to fund public services. 
 
SB 1290 (Durzao), Chapter 340, vacates certain county-assessed or court-ordered costs 
imposed before January 1, 2018, against parents and guardians of youth subject to the 
juvenile delinquency system and against persons aged 18 to 21 subject to the criminal justice 
system.  Specifically, this new law:   
• Provides that the unpaid outstanding balance of any of the following county-assessed or 
court-ordered costs imposed before January 1, 2018, against the parent, guardian, or other 
person liable for the support of a minor is vacated and is unenforceable and uncollectable 
if the minor was adjudged to be a ward of the juvenile court, was on probation without 
being adjudged a ward, was the subject of a petition filed to adjudge the minor a ward, or 
was the subject of a program of supervision, as specified: 
 
o Reasonable costs of transporting a minor to a juvenile facility and for the costs of the 
minor's food, shelter, and care at the juvenile facility when the minor has been held in 
temporary custody; 
 
o Costs of support for a minor detained in a juvenile facility; 
 
o Costs to the county or the court of legal services rendered to a minor by an attorney 




o Registration fee up to $50 for appointed legal counsel; 
 
o Costs of minor's probation supervision, home supervision, or electronic monitoring; 
 
o Costs of food, shelter, and care of a minor who remains in the custody of probation or 
detained at a juvenile facility after the parent or guardian receives notice of release; 
 
o Costs of support of a minor placed in out-of-home placement pursuant to a juvenile 
court order; and, 
 
o Costs of care, support, and maintenance of a minor who is voluntarily placed in out-
of-home care when the minor receives specified aid. 
 
• Provides that the unpaid outstanding balance of any county-assessed or court-ordered 
costs imposed before January 1, 2018, to cover the costs of drug testing a minor on 
probation for a drug case is vacated and shall be unenforceable and uncollectable.  
 
• Specifies that the foregoing provisions apply to dual status children for purposes of 
delinquency jurisdiction. 
 
• Provides that the unpaid outstanding balance of any county-assessed or court-ordered 
costs imposed before January 1, 2018, for home detention administrative fees and 
probation drug testing fees against persons age 18 to 21 and under the jurisdiction of the 








AB 2061 (Limón) – Firearms: inspections 
 
Existing law prescribes specific rule and regulations relating to gun shows and events, and the 
organizers, vendor and participants, including the rules governing the transfer of firearms at 
these events. However, the Department of Justice (DOJ) lacks inspection authority over vendors 
who hold a federal firearms license, but are not required to obtain a California license. All 
firearms dealers and ammunition vendors conducting business in California should be operating 
under the same rules.  
 
AB 2061 (Limon), Chapter 273, authorizes the DOJ, effective July 1, 2022, to inspect 
all firearms dealers, ammunition vendors, or manufacturers in order to ensure compliance 
with state and federal firearms laws. 
 
 
AB 2362 (Muratsuchi) – Firearms dealers:  conduct of business 
 
In order to operate in California, firearms dealers and license holders must have (1) a Federal 
Firearms License, (2) a license issued by a county or other local agency, and (3) a Certificate of 
Eligibility issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ). If they have all of these items, they are 
included on the DOJ-maintained centralized list that allows them to operate their business. The 
DOJ conducts spontaneous on-site inspections of dealers and license holders to ensure they are 
complying with transfer requirements, dealer record and record retention requirements, facility 
maintenance and security requirements, and waiting period requirements. 
 
If a dealer or license holder is out of compliance, the DOJ sends written notification requesting 
corrective action. Follow up inspections may be performed to ensure corrective action has been 
taken. Not every instance of non-compliance warrants revocation of a certificate or removal from 
the centralized list; however, DOJ lacks authority to impose progressive disciplinary actions.  
  
AB 2362 (Muratsuchi), Chapter 284, authorizes, commencing July 1, 2021, the DOJ to 
impose civil fines on firearms dealers for breaches of regulations or prohibitions related to 
their firearms dealers license. Specifically, this new law: 
 
• Permits the DOJ to impose a civil fine of up to $1,000 against firearms dealers for a 
breach of specified prohibitions relating to firearms dealer licensing. 
 
• Provides for a civil fine of up to $3,000 for breaches that subject a licensee to forfeiture 
of their firearms dealer license for either of the following: 
 
o The licensee previously received written notification from the DOJ regarding the 




o The licensee is otherwise determined by the DOJ to have knowingly or with gross 
negligence violated a regulation or prohibition related to licensing. 
 
• Allows DOJ to adopt regulations setting fine amounts and setting up an appeals process. 
 
• Requires that any fines collected by the DOJ be deposited in the Dealers Record of Sale 
Special Account (DROSS), for expenditure by the department to offset the cost of 
firearms related regulatory or enforcement activity. 
 
 
AB 2617 (Gabriel) – Firearms: gun violence restraining orders 
 
California's Gun Violence Restrain Order (GVRO) laws went into effect on January 1, 2016.  
The statutory scheme establishes three types of GVRO's:  (1) a temporary emergency GVRO, (2) 
an ex-parte GVRO, and (3) a GVRO issued after notice and hearing. All three GVROs prohibit 
the subject of the order from having in his or her custody or control, owning, or purchasing, a 
firearm or ammunition for a specified time period.   
 
A number of other states have GVRO laws which are similar to California.  California currently 
enforces a number of firearm restrictions based on conduct occurring in other states. However, 
California currently has no mechanism to enforce GVROs issued in by other states. 
 
AB 2617 (Gabriel), Chapter 286, requires California to honor similar or equivalent 
GVROs, as specified, that are issued by states other than California. Specifically, this new 
law: 
• States that any person who owns or possesses a firearm or ammunition with knowledge 
that they are prohibited from doing so because of a by a valid order issued by an out-of-
state jurisdiction that is similar or equivalent to a GVRO, as specified, is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. 
• Prohibits a person convicted of the misdemeanor, described above, from owning or 
possessing a firearm or ammunition for a five-year period, to commence upon the 
expiration of the existing gun violence restraining order.   
• Specifies that a valid order issued by an out-of-state jurisdiction that is similar or 
equivalent to a GVRO means an out-of-state order issued upon a showing by clear and 
convincing evidence that the person poses a significant danger of causing personal injury 
to themselves or another because of owning or possessing a firearm or ammunition. 
 
• States that a law enforcement officer who requests a temporary emergency GVRO must 
file a copy of the order with the court as soon as practicable, but not later than 3 court 






AB 2699 (Santiago) – Firearms: unsafe handguns 
 
Under existing law any person in California who manufactures or causes to be manufactured, 
imports into the state for sale, keeps for sale, offers or exposes for sale, gives, or lends any 
unsafe handgun shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year.   
The above prohibition does not apply to the sale or purchase of any pistol, revolver, or other 
firearm capable of being concealed upon the person, if the pistol, revolver, or other firearm is 
sold to, or purchased by, the Department of Justice, any police department, any sheriff's official, 
any marshal's office, the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency, the California Highway Patrol, 
any district attorney's office, or the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States 
for use in the discharge of their official duties. Nor shall anything in this section prohibit the sale 
to, or purchase by, sworn members of these agencies of any pistol, revolver, or other firearm 
capable of being concealed upon the person. 
 
AB 2699 (Santiago), Chapter 289, exempts the following entities, and sworn officers of 
these entities that have satisfactorily completed the firearms portion of the basic training 
course prescribed by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) 
from the prohibition against the sale or purchase of an “unsafe” handgun: 
 
• The California Horse Racing Board; 
 
• The State Department of Health Care services; 
 
• The State Department of Public Health; 
 
• The State Department of Social Services; 
 
• The Department of Toxic Substances Control; 
 
• The Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development; 
 
• The Public Employees Retirement System; 
 
• The Department of Housing and Community Development; 
 
• Investigators of the Department of Business Oversight; 
 
• The Law Enforcement Branch of the Office of Emergency Services; 
 
• The California State Lottery; and, 
 
• The Franchise Tax Board. 
 
• Provides that that the sale of “unsafe” handguns to specified law enforcement 
entities and the peace officers employed by those entities are only authorized 
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if the handgun is to be used as a service weapon. 
 
• Requires the Department of Justice (DOJ) to maintain a database of “unsafe 
handguns” that have been sold to peace officers that are exempt from the 
prohibition against the purchase of these handguns. The Department may 
satisfy this requirement by maintaining the information in any existing firearm 
database that reasonably facilitates compliance with this mandate 
 
• Requires the DOJ by March 1, 2021 provide a notification to the persons and 
entities that have purchased “unsafe handguns” regarding the prohibition 
against the sale or transfer of such a handgun. Thereafter the DOJ shall, upon 
notification of sale or transfer, provide the same notification to the purchaser 
or transferee of any unsafe handgun sold or transferred 
 
• Makes the unlawful sale or transfer of an “unsafe handgun”, or failure to 
report to the DOJ the sale or transfer of an “unsafe handgun” subject to a civil 
penalty not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000). 
 
 
AB 2847 (Chiu) – Firearms: unsafe handguns 
 
The firearm industry has acknowledged that microstamping is entirely feasible, but has 
maintained that it is not possible to microstamp in two separate places on the interior of a 
firearm which is the current mandate under the Unsafe Handgun Act (UHA). Although it is 
entirely practicable to have two engravings, it is not necessary. One engraving on the firing pin 
of a firearm reliably provides law enforcement the available and necessary information 
concerning the firearm. Firearm manufacturers should be able to easily and affordably comply 
with this mandate as well as the other important UHA quality and safety standards. 
 
AB 2847 (Chiu), Chapter 292, requires commencing July 1, 2022 all semiautomatic 
pistols not already listed on the Department of Justice (DOJ) roster of not unsafe 
handguns be equipped with chamber load indicators, magazine disconnect mechanisms, 
and microstamping technology. Specifically, this new law: 
 
• Requires commencing July 1, 2022 for all semiautomatic pistols that are not already 
listed on the DOJ roster of not unsafe handguns, be designed and equipped with a 
microscopic array of characters that identify the make, model, and serial number of 
the pistol, etched or otherwise imprinted in one or more places on the interior surface 
or internal working parts of the pistol, and that are transferred by imprinting on each 
cartridge case when the firearm is fired. 
 
• Requires commencing July 1, 2022 for all semiautomatic pistols that are not already 
listed on the DOJ roster of not unsafe handguns be equipped with a chamber load 




• Provides that the DOJ shall, for each newly added semiautomatic pistol added to the 
roster of not unsafe handguns, remove from the roster exactly three semiautomatic 
pistols lacking a chamber load indicator, magazine disconnect mechanism, or 
microstamping technology. Each semiautomatic pistol removed from the roster shall 
be considered an unsafe handgun. The Attorney General (AG) shall remove 




SB 723 (Jones) – Firearms: prohibited persons 
Under current law, if a person has an outstanding arrest warrant for any felony, or for specified 
misdemeanors, the person is prohibited from owning or possessing a firearm. Current law 
requires that the person be aware of the arrest warrant in order to be found criminally liable for 
possession of a firearm. A person violating the prohibition on the possession of a firearm because 
of an outstanding arrest warrant for a felony crime is guilty of a felony. A person violating the 
prohibition on the possession of a firearm because of an outstanding arrest warrant for a 
specified misdemeanor is guilty of an alternate felony/misdemeanor.  
 
The provisions of law requiring persons with active warrants for felonies and specified 
misdemeanors be prohibited from firearm possession were implemented in a budget trailer bill, 
AB 103 (Committee on Budget), Chapter 17, Statutes of 2017. Initially, there was no 
requirement that the person who was the subject of the active warrant have any knowledge that 
they had an arrest warrant.  Later in the year, SB 112 (Committee Budget and Fiscal Review), 
Chapter 363, Statutes of 2017, was signed into law. SB 112 specified that a violation for 
possession of a firearm when prohibited because of an outstanding warrant, requires a person to 
have knowledge of the outstanding warrant before the person could be found guilty of a crime. 
 
SB 723 (Jones), Chapter 306, clarifies that a person with an active arrest warrant for a 
prohibited offense must have knowledge of the warrant in order to be criminally liable as 





GUN VIOLENCE RESTRAINING ORDERS 
 
 
AB 2617 (Gabriel) – Firearms: gun violence restraining orders 
 
California's Gun Violence Restrain Order (GVRO) laws went into effect on January 1, 2016.  
The statutory scheme establishes three types of GVRO's:  (1) a temporary emergency GVRO, (2) 
an ex-parte GVRO, and (3) a GVRO issued after notice and hearing. All three GVROs prohibit 
the subject of the order from having in his or her custody or control, owning, or purchasing, a 
firearm or ammunition for a specified time period.   
 
A number of other states have GVRO laws which are similar to California.  California currently 
enforces a number of firearm restrictions based on conduct occurring in other states. However, 
California currently has no mechanism to enforce GVROs issued in by other states. 
 
AB 2617 (Gabriel), Chapter 286, requires California to honor similar or equivalent 
GVROs, as specified, that are issued by states other than California. Specifically, this new 
law: 
• States that any person who owns or possesses a firearm or ammunition with knowledge 
that they are prohibited from doing so because of a by a valid order issued by an out-of-
state jurisdiction that is similar or equivalent to a GVRO, as specified, is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. 
•  Prohibits a person convicted of the misdemeanor, described above, from owning or 
possessing a firearm or ammunition for a five-year period, to commence upon the 
expiration of the existing gun violence restraining order.   
• Specifies that a valid order issued by an out-of-state jurisdiction that is similar or 
equivalent to a GVRO means an out-of-state order issued upon a showing by clear and 
convincing evidence that the person poses a significant danger of causing personal injury 
to themselves or another because of owning or possessing a firearm or ammunition. 
 
• States that a law enforcement officer who requests a temporary emergency GVRO must 
file a copy of the order with the court as soon as practicable, but not later than 3 court 








AB 2321 (Jones-Sawyer) – Juvenile court records: access 
 
In 2000, Congress created the U-Visa and T-Visa classifications with its passage of the Victims 
of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (VTVPA). This law affords immigrants who are 
victims of a common or human trafficking crime with the opportunity to obtain an immigrant 
visa upon cooperation with law enforcement in an investigation of an underlying crime. The 
creation of the U- and T-Visas encourage immigrants to report crimes and receive protection 
from existing criminal laws.  
 
As a part of obtaining a U- or T-visa, a person must get certification by a prosecutor of 
helpfulness. Prosecutors must sign under penalty of perjury that a victim was helpful in a 
qualifying case. Without access to the files for review, prosecutors are unable to refresh their 
recollection or make an initial determination regarding helpfulness.  
 
AB 2321 (Jones-Sawyer), Chapter 137, permits a prosecutor or a court to access sealed 
juvenile records for the limited purpose of certifying victim helpfulness in an application for 
a U-Visa or a T-Visa. Specifically, this new law: 
 
• States that a record that was sealed pursuant to this section that was generated in 
connection with the investigation, prosecution, or adjudication of a qualifying offense as 
defined may be accessed by a judge or prosecutor for the limited purpose of processing a 
request of a victim or victim’s family member to certify victim helpfulness on the Form 
I-918 Supplement B certification or Form I-914 Supplement B declaration. Further states 
that the information obtained shall not be disseminated to other agencies or individuals, 
except as necessary to certify victim helpfulness on the Form I-918 Supplement B 
certification or Form I-914 Supplement B declaration, and under no circumstances shall it 
be used to support the imposition of penalties, detention, or other sanctions upon an 
individual. 
 
• Provides that when a new petition has been filed against the minor in juvenile court and 
the issue of competency is raised, by the probation department, the prosecuting attorney, 
counsel for the minor, and the court for the purpose of assessing the minor’s competency 
in the proceedings on the new petition. Further states that access, inspection, or utilization 
of the sealed records is limited to any prior competency evaluations submitted to the 
court, whether ordered by the court or not, all reports concerning remediation efforts and 
success, all court findings and orders relating to the minor’s competency, and any other 
evidence submitted to the court for consideration in determining the minor’s competency, 
including, but not limited to, school records and other test results. States that the 
information obtained pursuant to this subparagraph shall not be disseminated to any other 
person or agency except as necessary to evaluate the minor’s competency or provide 
remediation services, and shall not be used to support the imposition of penalties, 
detention, or other sanctions on the minor. Also provides that access to the sealed record 
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under this subparagraph shall not be construed as a modification of the court’s order 
dismissing the petition and sealing the record in the case. 
 
 
AB 2426 (Reyes) – Victims of crime 
 
In 2000, Congress created the U and T-Visa classifications with its passage of the Victims of 
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (VTVPA). This law affords immigrants who are victims 
of a common or human trafficking crime with the opportunity to obtain an immigrant visa upon 
cooperation with law enforcement in an investigation of an underlying crime. The creation of the 
U and T-Visas encourage immigrants to report crimes and receive protection from existing 
criminal laws. However, in many jurisdictions, immigrants experience difficulty and or delays in 
obtaining the proper documentation from law enforcement to certify their participation in the 
investigation. These delays can result directly in the denial of a U-Visa or T-Visa application, 
leaving an eligible immigrant unable to adjust their status and vulnerable to deportation.  
 
AB 2426 (Reyes), Chapter 187, specifies the law enforcement agencies that are required 
to process a victim certification for an immigrant victim of a crime for the purposes of 
obtaining U-Visas and T-Visas. Specifically, this new law: 
• Specifies that a “certifying entity” includes without limitation, the police department 
of the University of California, a California State University campus, or the police 
department of a school district, established pursuant to Section 38000 of the 
Education Code. 
• Provides that a certifying official shall not refuse to complete the Form I-918 Supplement B 
certification or to certify helpfulness because a case has already been prosecuted or otherwise 
closed, or because the time for commencing a criminal action has expired. 
 
• Provides that a certifying official shall not refuse to complete the Form I-914 Supplement B 
certification or to certify helpfulness because a case has already been prosecuted or otherwise 
closed, or because the time for commencing a criminal action has expired. 
 
 
AB 3228 (Bonta) – Private detention facilities 
 
The federal government contracts with private detention facilities (and county jails) throughout 
the country to house immigration detainees and federal criminal pretrial detainees. There are a 
variety of concerns about the how private detention centers are run.  It can be difficult to 
investigate those concerns because of a lack of transparency.  Private, for-profit detention 
facilities are accountable to their shareholders and not the people of the State of California. For 
example, these facilities claim exemptions to the public disclosure requirements under the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. § 552) because they are private corporations, 
which makes the potentially unlawful conduct occurring within the facility hidden from 
discovery.  These facilities similarly claim an exemption to California’s State counterpart, the 




Private detention centers have been particularly problematic during the Covid-19 pandemic. 
Private detention centers have been epicenters for Covid-19 because of the higher prevalence of 
infection, the higher levels of risk factors for infection, the close contact in often overcrowded, 
poorly ventilated facilities, and the poor access to health-care services relative to that in 
community settings. 
  
AB 3228 (Bonta), Chapter190, establishes a civil cause of action against private detention 
facilities which violate the requirement to comply with the detention standards of care and 
confinement, as specified. Specifically, this new law: 
• Requires a private detention facility operator to comply with, and adhere to, the detention 
standards of care and confinement agreed upon in the facility’s contract for operations. 
• Provides that if a private detention facility operator, or agent, or person acting on behalf 
of a detention facility operator, commits a tortious action that violates the requirement to 
comply with detention standards of care and confinement, an individual who has been 
injured by that tortious action may bring a civil action for relief.  
 
• Provides that the court, in its discretion, may award the prevailing plaintiff reasonable 









AB 901 (Gipson) – Juveniles 
 
The school-to-prison pipeline refers to policies and practices that push students out of school and 
into the juvenile and criminal justice systems.  The policies and practices including zero-
tolerance discipline policies, policing in schools, and court involvement for minor offenses in 
school.   
 
One strategy to mitigate the school-to-prison pipeline is for schools, districts, and states to 
evaluate their disciplinary policies and make punitive consequences, such as ticketing, fines 
imposed on students and/or their parents and guardians, or any punishment that removes students 
from the classroom, a last resort.  Punitive police can be replaced with systems that support 
students in an effort to reduce students encountering the legal system. 
AB 901 (Gipson), Chapter 323, repeals the jurisdiction of the juvenile criminal court over 
minors who habitually refuse to obey the reasonable and proper orders or directions of school 
authorities and provides direction as to when probation departments can engage with minors 
that are not on probation. Specifically, this new law: 
• Repeals the jurisdiction of the juvenile criminal court over minors who habitually refuse 
to obey the reasonable and proper orders or directions of school authorities.   
• Requires a peace officer to refer a minor who persistently or habitually refuses to obey 
the reasonable and proper orders or directions of the minor's parents or has four or more 
truancies within one school year to a community-based resource, the probation 
department, a health agency, a local educational agency, or other governmental entities 
that may provide services. 
• States that services offered to minors or minor's parents or guardians who are not on 
probation are voluntary and shall not include probation conditions or consequences as a 
result of not engaging in or completing those programs or services.  
• Directs probation to refer minors to services provided by a health agency, community-
based resource, the probation department, a health agency, a local educational agency, or 
other governmental entities that may provide services, as specified. 
• Specifies that a county board of education may enroll pupils in a county community 
school when the pupil is between 12 and 17 years of age, inclusive, and has been reported 
as a truant four or more times per school year or is a chronic absentee, as specified. 
 
 
AB 2321 (Jones-Sawyer) – Juvenile court records: access 
 
In 2000, Congress created the U-Visa and T-Visa classifications with its passage of the Victims 
of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (VTVPA). This law affords immigrants who are 
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victims of a common or human trafficking crime with the opportunity to obtain an immigrant 
visa upon cooperation with law enforcement in an investigation of an underlying crime. The 
creation of the U- and T-Visas encourage immigrants to report crimes and receive protection 
from existing criminal laws.  
 
As a part of obtaining a U- or T-visa, a person must get certification by a prosecutor of 
helpfulness. Prosecutors must sign under penalty of perjury that a victim was helpful in a 
qualifying case. Without access to the files for review, prosecutors are unable to refresh their 
recollection or make an initial determination regarding helpfulness.  
 
AB 2321 (Jones-Sawyer), Chapter 137, permits a prosecutor or a court to access sealed 
juvenile records for the limited purpose of certifying victim helpfulness in an application for 
a U-Visa or a T-Visa. Specifically, this new law: 
 
• States that a record that was sealed pursuant to this section that was generated in 
connection with the investigation, prosecution, or adjudication of a qualifying offense as 
defined may be accessed by a judge or prosecutor for the limited purpose of processing a 
request of a victim or victim’s family member to certify victim helpfulness on the Form 
I-918 Supplement B certification or Form I-914 Supplement B declaration. Further states 
that the information obtained shall not be disseminated to other agencies or individuals, 
except as necessary to certify victim helpfulness on the Form I-918 Supplement B 
certification or Form I-914 Supplement B declaration, and under no circumstances shall it 
be used to support the imposition of penalties, detention, or other sanctions upon an 
individual. 
 
• Provides that when a new petition has been filed against the minor in juvenile court and 
the issue of competency is raised, by the probation department, the prosecuting attorney, 
counsel for the minor, and the court for the purpose of assessing the minor’s competency 
in the proceedings on the new petition. Further states that access, inspection, or utilization 
of the sealed records is limited to any prior competency evaluations submitted to the 
court, whether ordered by the court or not, all reports concerning remediation efforts and 
success, all court findings and orders relating to the minor’s competency, and any other 
evidence submitted to the court for consideration in determining the minor’s competency, 
including, but not limited to, school records and other test results. States that the 
information obtained pursuant to this subparagraph shall not be disseminated to any other 
person or agency except as necessary to evaluate the minor’s competency or provide 
remediation services, and shall not be used to support the imposition of penalties, 
detention, or other sanctions on the minor. Also provides that access to the sealed record 
under this subparagraph shall not be construed as a modification of the court’s order 
dismissing the petition and sealing the record in the case. 
 
 
AB 2425 (Stone, M.) – Juvenile police records 
 
Previous legislation (SB 1038 (Leno), Chapter 249, Statutes of 2014) provided a process for 
automatic juvenile record sealing (i.e. without a petition from the minor) in cases involving 
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satisfactorily-completed informal supervision or probation, except in cases involving specified 
serious or violent offenses where the juvenile was 14 years or older at the time of the offense and 
the offense was not dismissed or reduced to a non-serious or non-violent offense. (Welf. & Inst. 
Code, § 786.) The sealing of delinquency records is an important factor in reducing recidivism 
and opening doors to jobs and education for many of California’s youth. 
 
Current law does not distinguish between a record of a youth who is counseled and released, and 
a youth who avoids arrest because they no longer fall within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 
The law also fails to distinguish between a juvenile police record that documents a diversion 
program referral, and a record that documents an arrest and subsequent referral to probation or 
the district attorney. Additionally, current law allows other law enforcement agencies to obtain a 
complete copy of the juvenile police record without notice or the consent of the youth who is the 
subject of the record.  
 
AB 2425 (Stone, M.), Chapter 330, prohibits the release of information by a law 
enforcement, social worker, or probation agency when a juvenile has participated in or 
completed a diversion program. Specifically, this new law:  
 
• Provides that a probation department shall seal the arrest and other records in its custody 
relating to a juvenile’s arrest and referral and participation in a diversion or supervision 
program under both of the following circumstances: 
 
o Upon satisfactory completion of a program of diversion or supervision to which a 
juvenile is referred by the probation officer in lieu of the filing of a petition to 
adjudge the juvenile a ward of the juvenile court, including a program of informal 
supervision pursuant to Welf. & Inst. Code Section 654. 
 
o Upon satisfactory completion of a program of diversion or supervision to which a 
juvenile is referred by the prosecutor in lieu of the filing of a petition to adjudge 
the juvenile a ward of the juvenile court, including a program of informal 
supervision pursuant to Welf. & Inst. Code Section 654. 
 
• States that the probation department shall notify the arresting law enforcement agency to 
seal the arrest records and the arresting law enforcement agency shall seal the records in 
its custody relating to the arrest no later than 60 days from the date of notification by the 
probation department. Upon sealing, the arresting law enforcement agency shall notify 
the probation department that the records have been sealed. Within 30 days from receipt 
of notification by the arresting law enforcement agency that the records have been sealed 
pursuant to this section, the probation department shall notify the minor in writing that 
their record has been sealed pursuant to this section. If records have not been sealed 
pursuant this section, the written notice from the probation department shall inform the 
minor of their ability to petition the court directly to seal their arrest and other related 
records. 
 
• Provides that upon sealing of the records pursuant to this section, the arrest or offense 
giving rise to any of the circumstances, as specified, shall be deemed not to have 
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occurred and the individual may respond accordingly to any inquiry, application, or 
process in which disclosure of this information is requested or sought. 
 
• States that for the records relating to the circumstances, as specified, the probation 
department shall issue notice as follows:  
 
o The probation department shall  notify a public or private agency operating a 
diversion program to which the juvenile has been referred under these 
circumstances to seal records in the program operator’s custody relating to the 
arrest or referral and the participation of the juvenile in the diversion or 
supervision program, and the operator of the program shall seal the records in its 
custody relating to the juvenile’s arrest or referral and participation in the program 
no later than 60 days from the date of notification by the probation department. 
Upon sealing, the public or private agency operating a diversion program shall 
notify the probation department that the records have been sealed. 
 
o An individual who receives notice from the probation department that the 
individual has not satisfactorily completed the diversion program and that the 
record has not been sealed pursuant to this section may petition the juvenile court 
for review of the decision in a hearing in which the program participant may seek 
to demonstrate, and the court may determine, that the individual has met the 
satisfactory completion requirement and is eligible for the sealing of the record by 
the probation department, the arresting law enforcement agency, and the program 
operator under the provisions of this section. 
 
• Provides that any record, that has been sealed pursuant to this section may be accessed, 
inspected, or utilized by the prosecuting attorney in order to meet a statutory or 
constitutional obligation to disclose favorable or exculpatory evidence to a defendant in a 
criminal case in which the prosecuting attorney has reason to believe that access to the 
record is necessary to meet the disclosure obligation. 
 
• States that a prosecuting attorney shall not use information contained in a record sealed 
pursuant to this section for any purpose other than those permitted by this law. 
 
• States that once the case at issue has been closed and is no longer subject to review on 




SB 203 (Bradford) – Juveniles: custodial interrogation 
 
“Miranda warnings” are a series of admonitions that are typically given by police prior to 
interrogating a suspect of a crime. The purpose of Miranda warnings is to advise people who 
have been arrested of their constitutional right against self-incrimination. They are the product of 
the landmark Supreme Court decision Miranda v. Arizona. In deciding that case, the Supreme 
Court imposed specific, constitutional requirements for the advice an officer must provide prior 
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to engaging in custodial interrogation and held that statements taken without these warnings are 
inadmissible against the defendant in a criminal case. Put simply, “Miranda warnings” are meant 
to inform people who are arrested of their constitutional right not to be a witness against 
themselves. Police are not required to speak a specific set of words but generally must convey 
that the person has the right not to answer any questions, that anything the person does say can 
be used against them as evidence in a court of law, that the person has the right to an attorney, 
that if the person cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed at no cost, and that the person 
has the right to invoke these rights at any point in time during questioning.   
 
A growing body of research indicates that adolescents are less capable of understanding their 
constitutional rights than their adult counterparts, and also that they are more prone to falsely 
confessing to a crime they did not commit. In brief, research suggests that adolescents are more 
impulsive, are more easily influenced by others (especially by figures of authority), are more 
sensitive to rewards (especially immediate rewards), and are less able to weigh in on the long-
term consequences of their actions than their adult counterparts. The context of custodial 
interrogation is believed to exacerbate these risks and there have been numerous studies showing 
that false confessions are disproportionately obtained from youthful suspects.  For that reason, 
this Legislature has previously enacted into law additional procedural protections for minors who 
are under the age of 16.   
 
SB 203 (Bradford), Chapter 335, provides for expanded protections for minors ages 16 
and 17 prior to custodial interrogation by law enforcement. Specifically, this new law: 
 
• Requires that prior to any custodial interrogation and before the waiver of any 
Miranda rights, a youth of 17 years or younger must consult with legal counsel in 
person, by telephone, or by video conference. 
 
• Prohibits the waiver of such consultation with legal counsel. 
 
• Requires the court to consider a lack of consultation with legal counsel for the 
purposes of determining the admissibility of any statements made to law enforcement, 
as well as in determining the credibility of any officer who willfully failed to comply 
with the consult requirement. 
 
• Eliminates the sunset date of January 1, 2025 for similar protections that applied only 
to minors under the age of 16, making them permanent.  
 
• Eliminates the requirement that the Governor convene a panel of experts to examine 
the effects and outcomes of requiring minors under the age of 16 to consult with 
counsel prior to any interrogation or Miranda waiver. 
 
 
SB 1126 (Jones) – Juvenile court records 
 
The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the criminal prosecution of a 
defendant who is not mentally competent to stand trial. Pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code 
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§ 709, when a youth is found to be not competent to stand trial, proceedings are suspended, and 
the petition must be dismissed if the youth is not remediated within a maximum of one year. 
 
Most juvenile records of arrests and adjudications are eligible to be sealed and treated as though 
they never occurred.  For less serious offenses, the juvenile court will often seal the record 
automatically.  Welfare & Institutions Code §786 provides certain exceptions to access sealed 
records under limited circumstances; however, if the same youth mentioned above, has a new 
petition filed against them and a doubt as to their competency is raised, there is no allowance for 
the court to access the sealed record.  
 
Not only is access to the old competency records necessary and relevant to the new competency 
determination, but in most cases where competency is an issue, the youth is high-risk and has 
special needs. Serious mental health issues or developmental disabilities are prevalent in this 
population. This population of youth in juvenile court are at greater risk of homelessness, 
underemployment/unemployment, and dropping out of school. 
 
SB 1126 (Jones), Chapter 338, allows sealed juvenile records to be accessed, inspected, 
or used by the probation department, the district attorney, counsel for the minor, and the 
court for the purpose of assessing the minor's mental competency in a subsequent 
juvenile proceeding if the issue of competency has been raised.  
 
 
SB 1290 (Durazo) – Juveniles: costs 
 
Effective January 1, 2018, SB 190 (Mitchell), Chapter 678, Statutes of 2017, repealed county 
authority to charge a number of administrative fees to parents and guardians with a youth in the 
juvenile justice system and to persons ages 18 to 21 in the adult criminal adult justice system. 
“Before [SB 190] was passed, families of minors could be involuntarily charged for home 
detention fees, drug testing fees, representation fees, and electronic monitoring fees. A study by 
students of the University of California Berkeley School of Law demonstrated the harm of the 
previous law. While the fees were originally designed to recuperate high costs, the costs 
collected barely covered the costs of administering such fees. Further, families of color were 
disparately disadvantaged by the fees. The new policies set forth in S.B. 190 aimed to eliminate a 
source of financial harm to vulnerable families, support the reentry of youth leaving the juvenile 
justice system, and reduce the likelihood that youth will recidivate.” 
(Recent Court Decisions and Legislation Affecting Juveniles: Recent Court Decisions and 
Legislation Affecting Juveniles (2018) 22 U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol’y 179, 197-198 [footnotes 
omitted].) 
 
Although, since January 1, 2018, SB 190 prohibits counties from assessing new fees, it does not 
require counties to stop collecting previously assessed fees or to vacate existing fee judgments. 
Continuing to collect fees from system-involved youth and their families is a regressive, racially 
discriminatory, and financially unsound way for government to fund public services. 
 
SB 1290 (Durzao), Chapter 340, vacates certain county-assessed or court-ordered costs 
imposed before January 1, 2018, against parents and guardians of youth subject to the 
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juvenile delinquency system and against persons aged 18 to 21 subject to the criminal justice 
system.  Specifically, this new law:   
• Provides that the unpaid outstanding balance of any of the following county-assessed or 
court-ordered costs imposed before January 1, 2018, against the parent, guardian, or other 
person liable for the support of a minor is vacated and is unenforceable and uncollectable 
if the minor was adjudged to be a ward of the juvenile court, was on probation without 
being adjudged a ward, was the subject of a petition filed to adjudge the minor a ward, or 
was the subject of a program of supervision, as specified: 
 
o Reasonable costs of transporting a minor to a juvenile facility and for the costs of the 
minor's food, shelter, and care at the juvenile facility when the minor has been held in 
temporary custody; 
 
o Costs of support for a minor detained in a juvenile facility; 
 
o Costs to the county or the court of legal services rendered to a minor by an attorney 
pursuant to an order of the juvenile court; 
 
o Registration fee up to $50 for appointed legal counsel; 
 
o Costs of minor's probation supervision, home supervision, or electronic monitoring; 
 
o Costs of food, shelter, and care of a minor who remains in the custody of probation or 
detained at a juvenile facility after the parent or guardian receives notice of release; 
 
o Costs of support of a minor placed in out-of-home placement pursuant to a juvenile 
court order; and, 
 
o Costs of care, support, and maintenance of a minor who is voluntarily placed in out-
of-home care when the minor receives specified aid. 
 
• Provides that the unpaid outstanding balance of any county-assessed or court-ordered 
costs imposed before January 1, 2018, to cover the costs of drug testing a minor on 
probation for a drug case is vacated and shall be unenforceable and uncollectable.  
 
• Specifies that the foregoing provisions apply to dual status children for purposes of 
delinquency jurisdiction. 
 
• Provides that the unpaid outstanding balance of any county-assessed or court-ordered 
costs imposed before January 1, 2018, for home detention administrative fees and 
probation drug testing fees against persons age 18 to 21 and under the jurisdiction of the 









AB 465 (Eggman) – Mental Health Workers: Supervision 
 
There has been general discussion in the Legislature and across the country that law enforcement 
officials are not the ideal first responders to scenes of a mental health crisis. In Eugene, Oregon, 
a program called Cahoots (Crisis Assistance Helping Out on the Street) is a nonprofit that 
responds to non-criminal calls around homelessness, substance use, and mental health. They are 
tied directly into the 911 system and can respond to calls without police. It’s reported that in 
2017, Cahoots handled 17-percent of police calls. This additional help has been seen as a benefit 
to both the community and officers who can focus on other issues. 
 
The City of Oakland is pursuing their own version of this model for a pilot program in the fall of 
2020 based on that simple principle of having mental health workers respond to mental health 
issues. Additionally, nonprofits in other cities, including Sacramento, are looking to act as an 
alternative to police in dealing with these calls. These programs recognize that police officers are 
not trained to be mental health professionals. As they expand, and local governments experiment, 
it is important that those responding are properly supervised by licensed clinicians.  
 
AB 465 (Eggman), Chapter 137, provide that if mental health professionals participate in a 
program assisting law enforcement in serving the community, or respond to calls for service 
instead of law enforcement, that those mental health professionals shall be supervised by 
licensed mental health professionals. Specifically, this new law: 
 
• Provides that in any program or pilot program in which mental health professionals respond in 
collaboration with law enforcement personnel, or in place of law enforcement, to emergency calls 
related to a mental health crises shall ensure that mental health professionals participating in the 
program are supervised by a licensed mental health professional. 
 
• Defines a “licensed mental health professional” as any one of the following: 
 
o licensed clinical social worker;  
 
o licensed professional clinical counselor;  
 
o licensed marriage and family therapist; and,  
 











AB 2512 (Stone, M.) – Death Penalty: person with an intellectual disability 
 
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court ruled that it is unconstitutional to execute someone 
with an intellectual disability. (Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536 U.S. 304, 321 (Atkins).) The Court 
left it up to the states to “‘develop[] appropriate ways’” to ensure that intellectually disabled 
defendants are not sentenced to death. (Id. at p. 317, quoting Ford v. Wainwright (1986) 477 
U.S. 399, 416-417.) The following year, the Legislature added Penal Code section 1376 to 
implement this decision. The intellectual disability standard set forth in the statute was derived 
from the two clinical definitions referenced by the Court in Atkins. (In re Hawthorne (2005) 35 
Cal.4th 40, 44, 47-48.) Unfortunately, despite the fact that clinical standards have changed over 
the years, the statute has not been updated.  
 
Regarding post-conviction relief, California Supreme Court guidance provides that a claim of 
intellectual disability should be raised by a petition for writ of habeas corpus. By its terms, the 
standards and procedures set forth in Penal Code section 1376 apply only to pre-conviction 
proceedings. However, our state High Court has concluded that post-conviction proceedings 
should “track[] section 1376 as closely as logic and practicality permit….” (In re Hawthorne, 
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 47.) 
 
AB 2512 (Stone), Chapter 331, authorizes a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of 
death to apply for an order directing that a hearing to determine intellectual disability be 
conducted as part of a habeas corpus petition and revises the definition of intellectual 
disability. Specifically, this new law:   
 
• States that the United States Supreme Court has recognized that it is unconstitutional 
to execute a person with an intellectual disability. It is the intent of the Legislature 
that California adopt the professional medical community’s definition and 
understanding of intellectual disability. It is the further intent of the Legislature that 
individuals with intellectual disabilities be accurately and quickly identified to avoid 
protracted and unnecessary litigation. 
 
• Revises the definition of "intellectual disability" to mean the condition of 
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with 
deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested before the end of the developmental 
period, as defined by clinical standards. 
 
• Defines "prima facie showing of intellectual disability" to mean that the defendant's 
allegation of intellectual disability is based on the type of evidence typically relied on 
by a qualified expert in diagnosing intellectual disability, as defined in current clinical 
standards, or when a qualified expert provides a declaration diagnosing the defendant 
as intellectually disabled. 
 
• Requires the court to order a hearing to determine whether the defendant is a person 




• Authorizes a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of death to apply for an order 
directing that a hearing to determine intellectual disability be conducted as part of a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  
 
• Provides that when the claim of intellectual disability is raised in a petition for habeas 
corpus and a petitioner makes a prima facie showing of intellectual disability, the 
reviewing court shall issue an order to show cause if the petitioner has met the prima 
facie standard.  
 
• Specifies that the petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the petitioner is a person with an intellectual disability.  
 
• Provides that the state may present its case regarding the issue of whether the 
petitioner is a person with an intellectual disability. Each party may offer rebuttal 
evidence. 
 
• Provides that during an evidentiary hearing under the habeas corpus provisions, an 
expert may testify about the contents of out-of-court statements, including 
documentary evidence and statements from witnesses when those types of statements 
are accepted by the medical community as relevant to a diagnosis of intellectual 
disability if the expert relied upon these statements as the basis for their opinion.  
 
• Prohibits changing or adjusting the results of a test measuring intellectual functioning 
based on race, ethnicity, national origin, or socioeconomic status. 
 
 
SB 1126 (Jones) – Juvenile court records 
 
The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the criminal prosecution of a 
defendant who is not mentally competent to stand trial. Pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code 
§ 709, when a youth is found to be not competent to stand trial, proceedings are suspended, and 
the petition must be dismissed if the youth is not remediated within a maximum of one year. 
 
Most juvenile records of arrests and adjudications are eligible to be sealed and treated as though 
they never occurred.  For less serious offenses, the juvenile court will often seal the record 
automatically.  Welfare & Institutions Code §786 provides certain exceptions to access sealed 
records under limited circumstances; however, if the same youth mentioned above, has a new 
petition filed against them and a doubt as to their competency is raised, there is no allowance for 
the court to access the sealed record.  
 
Not only is access to the old competency records necessary and relevant to the new competency 
determination, but in most cases where competency is an issue, the youth is high-risk and has 
special needs. Serious mental health issues or developmental disabilities are prevalent in this 
population. This population of youth in juvenile court are at greater risk of homelessness, 




SB 1126 (Jones), Chapter 338, allows sealed juvenile records to be accessed, inspected, 
or used by the probation department, the district attorney, counsel for the minor, and the 
court for the purpose of assessing the minor's mental competency in a subsequent 











AB 465 (Eggman) – Mental Health Workers: Supervision 
 
There has been general discussion in the Legislature and across the country that law enforcement 
officials are not the ideal first responders to scenes of a mental health crisis. In Eugene, Oregon, 
a program called Cahoots (Crisis Assistance Helping Out on the Street) is a nonprofit that 
responds to non-criminal calls around homelessness, substance use, and mental health. They are 
tied directly into the 911 system and can respond to calls without police. It’s reported that in 
2017, Cahoots handled 17-percent of police calls. This additional help has been seen as a benefit 
to both the community and officers who can focus on other issues. 
 
The City of Oakland is pursuing their own version of this model for a pilot program in the fall of 
2020 based on that simple principle of having mental health workers respond to mental health 
issues. Additionally, nonprofits in other cities, including Sacramento, are looking to act as an 
alternative to police in dealing with these calls. These programs recognize that police officers are 
not trained to be mental health professionals. As they expand, and local governments experiment, 
it is important that those responding are properly supervised by licensed clinicians.  
 
AB 465 (Eggman), Chapter 137, provide that if mental health professionals participate in a 
program assisting law enforcement in serving the community, or respond to calls for service 
instead of law enforcement, that those mental health professionals shall be supervised by 
licensed mental health professionals. Specifically, this new law: 
 
• Provides that in any program or pilot program in which mental health professionals respond in 
collaboration with law enforcement personnel, or in place of law enforcement, to emergency calls 
related to a mental health crises shall ensure that mental health professionals participating in the 
program are supervised by a licensed mental health professional. 
 
• Defines a “licensed mental health professional” as any one of the following: 
 
o licensed clinical social worker;  
 
o licensed professional clinical counselor;  
 
o licensed marriage and family therapist; and,  
 
o licensed psychologist. 
 
 
AB 732 (Bonta) – County jails:  prisons:  incarcerated pregnant persons 
 
Existing law requires the Board of State and Community Corrections to establish minimum 
standards for state and local correctional facilities. The standards include specific ones for 
pregnant incarcerated persons. (Pen. Code, § 6030.) A 2016 report by the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) of California noted that “protections that address obstetric care, housing 
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accommodations, and the presence of a support person during labor and delivery, among other 
issues, are confined to a section of the California Code of Regulations that applies to prisons but 
not jails.” (Reproductive Health Behind Bars in California, supra, at p. 28.)  The report 
recommended aligning policies to ensure that pregnant incarcerated individuals throughout 
California are treated equitably. (Ibid.) The report also recommended adopting policies with 
gender-neutral language. (Ibid.) 
 
AB 732 (Bonta), Chapter 321, requires jails and prisons to offer incarcerated persons 
who are possibly pregnant or capable of becoming pregnant a pregnancy test, and 
requires specified medical treatment and services for incarcerated persons in county jail 
and state prison who are pregnant. Specifically, this new law:   
 
• Provides that if an incarcerated person is identified as possibly pregnant or capable of 
becoming pregnant, the incarcerated person shall be offered the opportunity to 
voluntarily take a pregnancy test. 
 
• Protects access to reproductive services, including abortions, and requires unbiased 
counseling on options that includes information on prenatal health care, adoption, and 
abortion. 
  
• States that if an incarcerated person is confirmed to be pregnant, then an examination 
must be scheduled within seven days of arrival at the jail or prison. 
 
• Provides a schedule for prenatal care visits. 
 
• Mandates that pregnant incarcerated persons have access to prenatal vitamins and 
newborn care.   
 
• Requires that a pregnant person incarcerated in a multi-tier housing unit be assigned 
to a lower bunk and lower tier housing. 
 
• States that eligible pregnant incarcerated persons are to be given notice of and access 
to community-based programs serving pregnant, birthing, or lactating incarcerated 
persons.   
 
• Prohibits the use of tasers, pepper spray, or any other chemical weapons on pregnant 
incarcerated persons. 
 
• States that pregnant incarcerated persons who have used opioids prior to 
incarceration, or who are currently receiving methadone treatment, shall be offered 
medication assisted treatment with methadone or buprenorphine. They must also be 
given information on the risks of withdrawal. 
• Requires each incarcerated pregnant person be referred to a social worker who must 
discuss options for placement and care of the child after delivery, assist with phone 





• States that a pregnant incarcerated person shall be taken to a hospital for purposes of 
giving birth. They may also have a verified support person present during labor, 
childbirth, and during postpartum recovery while hospitalized. 
 
• Requires postpartum examinations by a medical provider once the incarcerated 
person is back in jail or prison. 
 
• Requires that incarcerated persons be provided materials necessary for personal 
hygiene with regard to their menstrual cycle and reproductive system, upon request. 
 
 
AB 1145 (Garcia, C.) – Child Abuse: reportable conduct 
 
The Child Abuse Neglect and Reporting Act (CANRA) was established in 1981 for the purpose 
of protecting children from abuse and neglect. The law imposes a mandatory reporting 
requirement on individuals whose professions bring them into contact with children.  Under 
CANRA, “child abuse” includes “sexual abuse,” and “sexual abuse” consists of “sexual assault” 
or “sexual exploitation.” The definition of sexual assault includes specific crimes involving 
sexual contact. 
 
In 2013, the Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA) evaluated the issue of whether CANRA 
requires practitioners to report all conduct by minors that fall under the definition of sodomy and 
oral copulation. Relying on case law and the legislative intent behind CANRA, DCA concluded 
that mandated reporters are not required to report consensual sex between minors of like age for 
any of the conduct listed as sexual assault unless the practitioner reasonably suspects that the 
conduct resulted from force, undue influence, coercion, or other indicators of child abuse.  
Because sexual conduct of minors that meet the definition of sodomy and oral copulation must 
be treated the same as all other conduct listed in the section (i.e. Penal Code Section 288), only 
instances involving acts that are nonconsensual, abusive or involves minors of disparate ages, 
conduct between minors and adults, and situations where there are indicators of abuse. (See 
DCA, Memorandum on the Evaluation of CANRA Reform Proposal Related to Reporting 
Consensual Sex Between Minors (Apr. 11, 2013).) 
 
AB 1145 (C. Garcia), Chapter 180, eliminates the requirement that mandated reporters 
under CANRA report specified consensual sexual conduct involving minors by redefining 
the scope of “sexual assault.” Specifically, this new law: 
 
• Specifies that “sexual assault” shall not include specified consensual sexual conduct for 
purposes of mandated reporting of child abuse under CANRA.   
 
• States that “sexual assault” for the purposes of CANRA does not include voluntary 
conduct for sodomy, oral copulation, or sexual penetration with a foreign object, if there 
are no indicators of abuse, unless the conduct is between a person 21 years of age or older 
and a minor who is under 16 years of age. 
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AB 1185 (McCarty) – County board of supervisors: sheriff oversight 
 
County sheriffs’ offices are vested with substantial authority over Californians, including the 
powers to detain, search, arrest, and use deadly force. They are also responsible for the welfare 
of the more than 75,000 incarcerated individuals in California’s jail system. The misuse of such 
authority can result in constitutional violations as well as harm to public safety and trust.  
Meaningful independent oversight and monitoring of sheriffs’ departments can increase 
government accountability and transparency, enhance public safety, and build community trust 
in law enforcement. Meaningful oversight requires some amount of authority over the sheriffs’ 
offices and the independence to conduct credible and thorough investigations. 
 
One instrument of investigation is known as a subpoena. A subpoena is a writ used to summon 
witnesses before a court or other deliberative body. A subpoena “duces tecum” is a specific type 
of subpoena that is used to require a witness to present documents and records to the deliberative 
body.   
 
AB 1185 (McCarty) Chapter 342, provides that counties may establish sheriff oversight 
boards to assist the board of supervisors with those duties as they relate to the sheriff. 
Specifically, this new law: 
 
• Authorizes the counties to establish sheriff oversight boards, either by action of the 
board of supervisors or through a vote of county residents. 
 
• Authorizes a sheriff oversight board to issue a subpoena when deemed necessary to 
investigate a matter within the jurisdiction of the board. 
 
• Authorizes the counties to establish an office of the inspector general to assist the 
board with its supervisorial duties. 
 
 
AB 1775 (Jones-Sawyer) – False reports and harassment 
 
Existing law prohibits the use of a telephone for the purpose of annoying or harassing an 
individual through the 911 line. It also provides that it is unlawful to knowingly use the 911 
telephone system for any reason other than an emergency. 
 
Current law on false police reporting does not address the growing number of cases in which 
peace officers are summoned to violate the rights of individuals for engaging in everyday 
activities, such as those individuals essentially living their lives.  Recently, media reports people 
calling 911 and making a false claim to harass a person, and a number of these incidents it 
appears by the language used that the harassment was in part because the person was a member 
of a protected class. In considering this issue, the Legislature declared their intent to end 
instances of 911 emergency system calls that are aimed at violating the rights of individuals 




The Legislature declared that all Californians, including people of color, should have the liberty 
to live their lives, and to go about their business, without living under the threat or fear of being 
confronted by police. Prejudicial 911 emergency system calls cause mistrust between 
communities of color and institutions, and those calls further deteriorate community-police 
relations.  
 
AB 1775 (Jones-Sawyer) Chapter 327, makes it a crime to knowingly allow the use of or to 
use the 911 emergency system for the purpose of harassing another. Specifically, this new 
law: 
 
• Punishes the use of the 911 emergency system for the purpose of harassing another is a 
crime that is punishable as follows: 
 
o For a first violation, as an infraction punishable by a two-hundred-fifty dollar 
($250) fine or as a misdemeanor punishable by up to six months in a county jail, a 
fine of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that imprisonment and 
fine. 
 
o For a second or subsequent violation, as a misdemeanor punishable by up to six 
months in a county jail, a fine of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both 
that imprisonment and fine. 
 
• Punishes the use of the 911 emergency system for the purpose of harassing another 
person and that act is an unlawful hate crime, providing that the person who commits the 
act is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in a county jail, a fine of not 
less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by 
both that imprisonment and fine. 
 
• Provides that this section does not apply to uses of the 911 emergency system by a person 
with an intellectual disability or other mental disability that makes it difficult or 
impossible for the person to understand the potential consequences of their actions. 
 
• Provides that, for purposes of this new law, “intimidation by threat of violence” includes, 
but is not limited to, “making or threatening to make a claim or report to a peace officer 
or law enforcement agency that falsely alleges that another person has engaged in 
unlawful activity or in an activity that requires law enforcement intervention, knowing 
that the claim or report is false, or with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the 
claim or report.” 
 
 
AB 2606 (Cervantes) – Criminal Justice: Supervised Release File 
 
The California Law Enforcement Communications System (CLETS) is set forth in Government 
Code section 15150 et seq. It is “a statewide telecommunications system of communication for 




Under current law, the Department of Justice (DOJ) in conjunction with the California 
Department of Corrections must update supervised release files on CLETS every 10 days to 
show recent inmates paroled from facilities under its jurisdiction. (Pen. Code, § 14216, subd. 
(a).) The DOJ has a similar duty in conjunction with the Department of State Hospitals (DSH) to 
update these records to show patients undergoing community health treatment and supervision 
through the conditional release program administered by DSH, except as specified. (Pen. Code, § 
14216, subd. (b).) There is no similar requirement to update CLETS with information regarding 
individuals who have been released under county supervision – i.e., persons on probation, 
mandatory supervision, and postrelease community supervision (PRCS). As a result, this 
information is often incomplete and not available to law enforcement. 
 
AB 2606 (Cervantes), Chapter 332, requires each county probation department or other 
supervising county agency to update any supervised release file that is available to them 
on CLETS every 10 days by entering any person placed onto postconviction supervision 
within their jurisdiction and under their authority, including persons on probation, 
mandatory supervision, and PRCS.   
 
 
AB 3099 (Ramos) – Department of Justice: law enforcement assistance with tribal issues 
 
According to most recent census data, California is home to more people of Native American 
and Alaska Native heritage than any other state in the country. There are currently 109 federally 
recognized Indian tribes and over 70 non-federally recognized tribes in California. Tribes in 
California currently have nearly 100 separate reservations or rancherias. There are also a number 
of individual Indian trust allotments. These lands constitute “Indian country.”  
 
In passing Public Law 83-280, Congress expressly granted California concurrent criminal 
jurisdiction with California’s tribal governments over specified areas of Indian country within 
the state for the enforcement of statewide criminal laws. A lack of consistency in the application 
of Public Law 280 on California Indian country currently exists statewide as advocates argue that 
this creates jurisdictional uncertainty for local law enforcement and California tribes with Indian 
land. This uncertainty applies specifically in the context of missing persons. 
 
Existing law establishes a California missing persons registry, in addition to other missing 
persons networks and databases that are designed to assist law enforcement in their 
investigations of missing and unidentified persons in California. However, there is public 
concern that when crimes are committed on these lands, they are not properly documented and 
investigated 
AB 3099 (Ramos) Chapter 170, requires the Department of Justice, upon funding, to 
provide technical assistance relating to tribal issues to local law enforcement agencies, as 
specified, and tribal governments with Indian lands. Specifically, this new law: 
• Provides that to improve upon the implementation of concurrent criminal jurisdiction on 
California Indian lands, the Department of Justice shall, subject to an appropriation by 
the Legislature, in a manner to be prescribed by the department, provide technical 
assistance to local law enforcement agencies that have Indian lands within or abutting 
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their jurisdictions, and to tribal governments with Indian lands, including those with and 
without tribal law enforcement agencies, to include, but not be limited to, all of the 
following: 
 
o Providing guidance for law enforcement education and training on policing and 
criminal investigations on Indian lands that supports consistent implementation 
of California’s responsibilities for enforcing statewide criminal laws on Indian 
lands that protect the health, safety, and welfare of tribal citizens on Indian lands; 
 
o Providing guidance on improving crime reporting, crime statistics, criminal 
procedures, and investigative tools for conducting police investigations of 
statewide criminal laws on Indian lands; 
 
o Providing educational materials about the complexities of concurrent criminal 
jurisdiction with tribal governments and their tribal law enforcement agencies, 
specifically to tribal citizens on Indian lands, including information on how to 
report a crime, and information relating to victim’s rights and victim services in 
California; and, 
 
o Facilitating and supporting improved communication between local law 
enforcement agencies and tribal governments or tribal law enforcement agencies 
for purposes of consistent implementation of concurrent criminal jurisdiction on 
California Indian lands. 
 
• States that to address the issues involving missing and murdered Native Americans in 
California, particularly missing and murdered Native American women and girls, the 
department shall, subject to an appropriation by the Legislature, in a manner to be 
prescribed by the department, conduct a study to determine how to increase state 
criminal justice protective and investigative resources for reporting and identifying 
missing Native Americans in California, particularly women and girls. The study shall 
include all of the following: 
 
o A determination of the scope of the issue of missing and murdered Native 
Americans in California, particularly women and girls; 
 
o Identification of barriers in reporting or investigating missing Native Americans 
in California, particularly women and girls; and, 
 
o Ways to create partnerships to increase cross-reporting and investigation of 
missing Native Americans in California, particularly women and girls, between 
federal, state, local, and tribal governments, including tribal governments without 
tribal law enforcement agencies. 
 
• States that as part of the study, the department shall conduct outreach to tribal 
governments in California, Native American communities, local, tribal, state, and federal 
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law enforcement agencies, and state and tribal courts. 
 
• Requires the department to submit a report to the Legislature upon completion of the 
study. The report shall include all of the following: 
 
o Data and analysis of the number of missing Native Americans in California, 
particularly women and girls; 
 
o Identification of the barriers to providing state resources to address the issue; and, 
 
o Recommendations, including any proposed legislation, to improve the reporting 




AB 3228 (Bonta) – Private detention facilities 
 
The federal government contracts with private detention facilities (and county jails) throughout 
the country to house immigration detainees and federal criminal pretrial detainees. There are a 
variety of concerns about the how private detention centers are run.  It can be difficult to 
investigate those concerns because of a lack of transparency.  Private, for-profit detention 
facilities are accountable to their shareholders and not the people of the State of California. For 
example, these facilities claim exemptions to the public disclosure requirements under the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. § 552) because they are private corporations, 
which makes the potentially unlawful conduct occurring within the facility hidden from 
discovery.  These facilities similarly claim an exemption to California’s State counterpart, the 
California Public Records Act (CPRA) (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq). 
 
Private detention centers have been particularly problematic during the Covid-19 pandemic. 
Private detention centers have been epicenters for Covid-19 because of the higher prevalence of 
infection, the higher levels of risk factors for infection, the close contact in often overcrowded, 
poorly ventilated facilities, and the poor access to health-care services relative to that in 
community settings. 
  
AB 3228 (Bonta), Chapter190, establishes a civil cause of action against private detention 
facilities which violate the requirement to comply with the detention standards of care and 
confinement, as specified. Specifically, this new law: 
• Requires a private detention facility operator to comply with, and adhere to, the detention 
standards of care and confinement agreed upon in the facility’s contract for operations. 
• Provides that if a private detention facility operator, or agent, or person acting on behalf 
of a detention facility operator, commits a tortious action that violates the requirement to 
comply with detention standards of care and confinement, an individual who has been 




• Provides that the court, in its discretion, may award the prevailing plaintiff reasonable 
attorney’s fees and costs, including expert witness fees, in these civil actions. 
 
 
SB 388 (Galgiani) - Missing persons: reports: local agencies 
 
Existing law requires all local police and sheriffs’ departments to accept reports of missing 
persons without delay and to use a specified form in order to obtain the release of dental or 
skeletal X-ray records, as provided. If the missing person is under 21 years of age, or the person 
is determined to be at risk, existing law requires the police department or sheriff’s department to 
broadcast a “Be On the Lookout” bulletin and to transmit the report to the Department of Justice, 
as provided. Also under existing law, local agencies can opt-out of these requirements. Local 
police and sheriffs’ departments may be exempt from complying with these provisions if their 
governing body, by a majority vote of the members of that body, adopts a resolution expressly 
making those requirements inoperative. 
 
SB 388 (Galgiani), Chapter 228, deletes the provision that permits a local agency to 
exempt itself from the provisions of law applying to missing person reports, and instead 
mandates application of the law. All local agencies must now comply with the procedures 
for reporting a missing person. 
 
 
SB 903 (Grove) – Grand Theft:  Agricultural Equipment 
 
Previous legislation (SB 224 (Grove), Chapter 119, Statutes of 2019) provided that in counties 
participating in a rural crime prevention program, the proceeds of any fine imposed for 
conviction of the crime of grand theft of agricultural equipment shall be allocated to the Central 
Valley Rural Crime Prevention Program or the Central Coast Rural Crime Prevention Program. 
 
The State Controller recently indicated these funds cannot be distributed without correcting a 
cross reference to the existing Central Valley and Central Coast Rural Crime Prevention Program 
fund distribution formula. 
 
SB 903 (Grove), Chapter 232, requires the proceeds of a fine imposed for grand theft 
involving agricultural equipment be allocated according to the Rural Crime Prevention 




SB 1196 (Umberg) – Price Gouging 
 
Current law makes it unlawful for retailers and service providers to price gouge during a 30 day 
period (180 days for reconstruction services) after a declared state of emergency. “Price 
gouging” is increasing the price of specified goods and services by more than 10% above the 
price of those goods and services were offered for prior to the declaration of emergency. The 
provisions of the price gouging statute are triggered when a state of emergency has been declared 
83 
 
by the President of the United States, the Governor, or officials at a county or municipal level, as 
specified. 
 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, sellers have been buying vitally needed consumer goods and 
personal protective equipment, thus depleting store shelves, and then selling those essential 
goods for extortionately high prices, online as well as in traditional retail stores. Many of these 
sellers were not offering these goods for sale prior to the pandemic and therefore are not covered 
by the existing price gouging law. 
 
SB 1196 (Umberg), Chapter 339, includes a person or entity that was not selling specified 
goods and services prior to the declaration of an emergency within the scope of the crime of 
price gouging. Specifically, this new bill: 
 
• Includes pandemic or epidemic disease outbreak in the lists of events that can trigger a 
declaration of emergency. 
 
• Specifies that a person, business, or other entity may not sell specified goods and services 
for a price of more than 10% greater than the price charged by that person for those 
goods or services immediately prior to the proclamation or declaration of emergency, or 
prior to a date set in the proclamation or declaration. 
 
• State that if a person, contractor, business, or other entity did not charge a price for the 
goods or services immediately prior to the proclamation or declaration of emergency, it 
may not charge a price that is more than 50% greater than the seller's existing costs, as 
specified. 
 
• Allows the Governor or the Legislature to extend the time frame for price gouging 
beyond 30 days without limit, while continuing to specify that each extension of the price 










AB 846 (Burke) – Public employment: public officers of employees declared by law to be 
peace officers 
 
The Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training (POST) was established by the 
Legislature in 1959 to set minimum selection and training standards for California law 
enforcement. POST develops and implements various courses to train peace officers, including 
both basic and continuing professional training. Peace officer basic training includes a minimum 
of 664 hours of POST-developed training and testing in 42 separate areas of instruction. 
According to POST’s website, most POST-certified basic training academies exceed the 664 
minimum hours by 200 or more hours. 
 
According to the Penal Code, peace officers must not engage in racial or identity profiling. In 
addition, peace officers are encouraged to not engage in racial or identity profiling through 
various POST courses but this has not resulted in less racial profiling. Recent reporting has found 
that 157 people died during encounters with police in the state in 2016 and that 42 percent of the 
civilians involved were Latino. Furthermore, although black people make up just 6% of the 
state's population, according to the most recent Census data, they represented nearly 20% of the 
use-of-force and shooting cases last year. More than half of the officers involved were white.  In 
the 2019 Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board (RIPA) report, in 2017 there were 741 
civilians involved in use of force incidents with Latino civilians comprising of 43.9% and Black 
civilians comprising of 19.3%. 
 
The 2019 RIPA report had also found that in 2018 several of the trainings did not meet all of the 
curriculum requirements. The Board is currently working with POST to recreate this training to 
better meet the requirements. RIPA’s recommendations strongly emulate AB 243. For example, 
RIPA also recommends more frequent trainings and inclusion of implicit bias training. 
 
AB 846 (Burke), Chapter 322, provides that evaluations of peace officers include an 
evaluation of bias against race or ethnicity, gender, nationality, religion, disability, or 
sexual orientation; and that every department or agency that employs peace officers 
review their job descriptions and deemphasize the paramilitary aspects of employment 
and place more emphasis on community interaction and collaborative problem solving.  
Specifically, this new law: 
 
• Requires that prospective officers' evaluations for mental fitness include bias against 
race or ethnicity, gender, nationality, religion, disability, or sexual orientation. 
 
• Requires, by January 1, 2022, for POST to study, review, and update regulations and 
screening materials to identify explicit and implicit bias against race or ethnicity, 
gender, nationality, religion, disability, or sexual orientation related to emotional and 




• Requires that local law enforcement agencies shall review their job descriptions used 
to recruit and hire peace officers and shall make changes that emphasize community-
based policing, familiarization between law enforcement and community residents, 
and collaborative problem solving, and de-emphasize the paramilitary aspects of the 
job.   
 
• Specifies that the recruitment provisions change is not intended to alter the required 
duties of any peace officer.   
 
• Provides that the Legislature finds and declares that changes to these job descriptions 
are necessary to allow peace officers to feel like the public can trust law enforcement 
and to implement problem-solving policing and intelligence-led policing strategies in 
contrast with reactive policing strategies. 
 
 
AB 1185 (McCarty) – Officer oversight: sheriff oversight board 
 
County sheriffs’ offices are vested with substantial authority over Californians, including the 
powers to detain, search, arrest, and use deadly force. They are also responsible for the welfare 
of the more than 75,000 incarcerated individuals in California’s jail system. The misuse of such 
authority can result in constitutional violations as well as harm to public safety and trust.  
Meaningful independent oversight and monitoring of sheriffs’ departments can increase 
government accountability and transparency, enhance public safety, and build community trust 
in law enforcement. Meaningful oversight requires some amount of authority over the sheriffs’ 
offices and the independence to conduct credible and thorough investigations. 
 
One instrument of investigation is known as a subpoena. A subpoena is a writ used to summon 
witnesses before a court or other deliberative body. A subpoena “duces tecum” is a specific type 
of subpoena that is used to require a witness to present documents and records to the deliberative 
body.   
 
AB 1185 (McCarty) Chapter 342, provides that counties may establish sheriff oversight 
boards to assist the board of supervisors with those duties as they relate to the sheriff. 
Specifically, this new law: 
 
• Authorizes the counties to establish sheriff oversight boards, either by action of the 
board of supervisors or through a vote of county residents. 
 
• Authorizes a sheriff oversight board to issue a subpoena when deemed necessary to 
investigate a matter within the jurisdiction of the board. 
 
• Authorizes the counties to establish an office of the inspector general to assist the 





AB 1196 (Gipson) – Peace Officers: Use of Force 
 
A choke hold is a technique, sometimes employed by law enforcement, that restricts the 
breathing of an individual by applying pressure directly to the wind pipe. The use of choke holds 
by law enforcement agencies in California has declined over many years due to serious injury 
and death caused by the usage of the technique. Both federal courts and California courts have 
found the practice of using choke holds subjects municipalities, government entities, and law 
enforcement agencies that permit their use liable for wrongful death and serious injury. As a 
result of these findings of liability, the usage of choke holds fell out of favor and cities and 
agencies routinely banned their usage. Additionally, the Commission on Peace Officer Standards 
and Training (POST) ceased instruction on the technique. However, the practice has never been 
expressly banned in California.   
 
A carotid restraint is very similar to a choke hold. The practice involves the cutting-off of blood 
circulation to the head of the person upon which the hold is placed rather than applying pressure 
directly to the wind pipe. This process can cause the person to lose consciousness. This 
technique has conventionally been taught to be less deadly than a traditional choke hold which 
can more easily collapse the wind pipe because it’s focused on the front of the neck. However, a 
slight deviation in the placement of the arm of the person implementing the hold can convert a 
carotid restraint into a choke hold. Additionally, cutting off blood flow to a person’s brain has its 
own dangers. Several high-profile officer involved deaths have resulted from the use of choke 
holds or carotid restraints. In the Eric Garner case, NY Commissioner James O'Neill said that the 
officer's failure to relax his grip while subduing him triggered a fatal asthma attack. George 
Floyd died in Minneapolis while a peace officer was applying his knee against the back of Mr. 
Floyd’s neck in an effort to subdue and detain him.   
 
AB 1196 (Gipson) Chapter 324, provides that law enforcement agencies are prohibited 
from authorizing carotid restraint holds and choke holds. Specifically, this new law: 
 
• Prohibits a law enforcement agency from authorizing the use of a carotid restraint 
hold or a choke hold as those terms are defined. 
 
• Defines "carotid restraint" as a vascular neck restraint or any similar restraint, hold, or 
other defensive tactic in which pressure is applied to the sides of a person's neck that 
involves a substantial risk of restricting blood flow and may render the person 
unconscious in order to subdue or control the person. 
 
• Define "choke hold" means any defensive tactic or force option in which direct 
pressure is applied to a person's trachea or windpipe. 
 
 
AB 1506 (McCarty) – Police use of force 
 
In California alone, there have been almost 800 fatal shootings by police since 2015, but 
only a small number of independent investigations have been conducted. While the vast 
majority of law enforcement officers, from county prosecutors to police officers, act in 
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accordance with appropriate professional and ethical standards, the current process of 
local district attorneys investigating local police has the possibility for bias and conflicts of 
interest.  
 
In March 2015, the Obama Administration released the “President’s Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing,” with recommendations and action items to strengthen community 
policing and trust among law enforcement and the communities they serve. The task force 
encouraged policies that mandate the use of external and independent prosecutors in cases 
of police use-of-force resulting in death, officer-involved shootings resulting in injury or 
death, or in-custody deaths. 
 
AB 1506 (McCarty), Chapter 326, provides that a state prosecutor shall conduct an 
investigation of any officer-involved shooting that resulted in the death of an unarmed 
civilian, as specified. It directs the Attorney General, beginning July 1, 2023, to 
operate a Police Practices Division within the Department of Justice (DOJ), to, upon 
request of a local law enforcement agency, review the use of deadly force policies of 
that law enforcement agency. Specifically, this new law: 
 
• Specifies that a state prosecutor shall investigate incidents of an officer-involved shooting 
resulting in the death of an unarmed civilian. 
 
• States that the Attorney General is the state prosecutor unless otherwise specified or 
named. 
 
• Specifies that a state prosecutor is authorized to do all of the following: 
 
o Investigate and gather facts in incidents involving a shooting by a peace officer 
that results in the death of an unarmed civilian; 
 
o For all investigations conducted, prepare and submit a written report; and, 
 
o And, if criminal charges against the involved officer are found to be warranted, 
initiate and prosecute a criminal action against the officer. 
 
• State that beginning on July 1, 2023, the Attorney General shall operate a Police Practices 
Division within DOJ to, upon request of a local law enforcement agency, review the use 
of deadly force policies of that law enforcement agency. 
 
• Specify that the Police Practices Division shall make specific and customized 
recommendations to any law enforcement agency that requests a review, based on those 
policies identified as recommended best practices. 
 






AB 2655 (Gipson) – Invasion of privacy: first responders 
 
Existing laws severely limit a government entity’s right and ability to share photos of deceased 
persons. For example, coroner’s photos are not disclosable except in limited cases. When a 
government entity takes possession of these sensitive records, it has a duty to take care not to 
disseminate them in a way that violates the expectation of privacy a family has in ensuring their 
loved ones’ gruesome death photos are not shared, lacking a legitimate public interest in the 
disclosure of those photos.  
 
However, recent events in California have shown that some government employees have acted 
with impunity in capturing and sharing tragic photos in a salacious manner. A few days after the 
helicopter crash that killed Kobe Bryant and eight others, the Los Angeles Times reported that a 
Los Angeles County sheriff’s deputy was showing gruesome photos taken at the scene of the 
accident to people in a bar. The Sheriff’s Department later determined that eight officers were 
ultimately involved in taking or obtaining photos from the scene without having a law 
enforcement purpose for doing so. These photos were only obtained by individuals by virtue of 
their employment as first responders to an accident scene. 
 
First responders like police and coroners have special access to the scenes of accidents and other 
deadly incidents by virtue of their public employment. While these employees have many 
legitimate reasons to capture images of a scene, the act of obtaining these photos for purely 
personal purposes is improper.  
 
AB 2655 (Gipson), Chapter 219, makes it a misdemeanor for a first responder, as defined, 
operating under color of authority, to use an electronic at the scene of an accident or crime to 
capture the image of a deceased person for any purpose other than an official law 
enforcement purpose or for a genuine public interest. Specifically, this new law: 
• Requires an agency that employs first responders on January 1, 2021 to notify its employees who 
are first responders of the prohibition imposed by this new law. 
 
• Makes it a crime for a first responder, operating under color of authority, who responds to the 
scene of an accident or crime to capture the photographic image of a deceased person by any 
means, including, but not limited to, by use of a personal electronic device or a device belonging 
to their employing agency, for any purpose other than an official law enforcement purpose or a 
genuine public interest is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not exceeding one 
thousand dollars ($1,000) per violation. 
 
• Creates the right to obtain a warrant when the property or things to be seized consists of evidence 
that tends to show that a violation of this new law has occurred or is occurring. Provides that 
evidence to be seized pursuant to this new law shall be limited to evidence of a violation of the 
prohibitions imposed by this new law and shall not include evidence of a violation of a 
departmental rule or guideline that is not a public offense under California law. 
 
• Defines, for purposes of this new law, “first responder” to mean a state or local peace officer, 
paramedic, emergency medical technician, rescue service personnel, emergency manager, 





AB 2699 (Santiago) – Firearms: unsafe handguns 
 
Under existing law any person in California who manufactures or causes to be manufactured, 
imports into the state for sale, keeps for sale, offers or exposes for sale, gives, or lends any 
unsafe handgun shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year.   
The above prohibition does not apply to the sale or purchase of any pistol, revolver, or other 
firearm capable of being concealed upon the person, if the pistol, revolver, or other firearm is 
sold to, or purchased by, the Department of Justice, any police department, any sheriff's official, 
any marshal's office, the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency, the California Highway Patrol, 
any district attorney's office, or the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States 
for use in the discharge of their official duties. Nor shall anything in this section prohibit the sale 
to, or purchase by, sworn members of these agencies of any pistol, revolver, or other firearm 
capable of being concealed upon the person. 
 
AB 2699 (Santiago), Chapter 289, exempts the following entities, and sworn officers of 
these entities that have satisfactorily completed the firearms portion of the basic training 
course prescribed by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) 
from the prohibition against the sale or purchase of an “unsafe” handgun: 
 
• The California Horse Racing Board; 
 
• The State Department of Health Care services; 
 
• The State Department of Public Health; 
 
• The State Department of Social Services; 
 
• The Department of Toxic Substances Control; 
 
• The Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development; 
 
• The Public Employees Retirement System; 
 
• The Department of Housing and Community Development; 
 
• Investigators of the Department of Business Oversight; 
 
• The Law Enforcement Branch of the Office of Emergency Services; 
 
• The California State Lottery; and, 
 
• The Franchise Tax Board. 
 
• Provides that that the sale of “unsafe” handguns to specified law enforcement 
entities and the peace officers employed by those entities are only authorized 
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if the handgun is to be used as a service weapon. 
 
• Requires the Department of Justice (DOJ) to maintain a database of “unsafe 
handguns” that have been sold to peace officers that are exempt from the 
prohibition against the purchase of these handguns. The Department may 
satisfy this requirement by maintaining the information in any existing firearm 
database that reasonably facilitates compliance with this mandate 
 
• Requires the DOJ by March 1, 2021 provide a notification to the persons and 
entities that have purchased “unsafe handguns” regarding the prohibition 
against the sale or transfer of such a handgun. Thereafter the DOJ shall, upon 
notification of sale or transfer, provide the same notification to the purchaser 
or transferee of any unsafe handgun sold or transferred 
 
• Makes the unlawful sale or transfer of an “unsafe handgun”, or failure to 
report to the DOJ the sale or transfer of an “unsafe handgun” subject to a civil 
penalty not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000). 
 
 
SB 480 (Archuleta ) – Law enforcement uniforms  
 
Existing law prohibits a law enforcement officer or any other person from wearing a uniform that 
is substantially similar to the official uniform of members of the California Highway Patrol 
(CHP) except duly appointed members of the CHP and persons authorized by the commissioner 
to wear such uniform in connection with a program of entertainment. Current law also provides 
that a uniform shall be deemed substantially similar to the uniform of the CHP if it so resembles 
such official uniform as to cause an ordinary reasonable person to believe that the person 
wearing the uniform is a member of the CHP.  
 
During active protests across the state in the summer of 2020, state and local law enforcement 
officers were heavily deployed on the streets, prior to and after the National Guard also 
responded in many cities. There were reports across the country that state and local law 
enforcement officials were increasingly wearing military-presenting uniforms, including specific 
accounts of officers in the Bay area. There are concerns that police wearing military-like fatigues 
has a negative psychological effect on the public. 
 
SB 480 (Archuleta), Chapter 336, prohibits a department or agency that employs peace 
officers from authorizing or allowing its employees to wear a uniform that is substantially 
similar to any uniform of the United States Armed Forces or state active militia. Specifically, 
this new law: 
 
• Prohibits a department or agency that employs peace officers from authorizing or allowing its 
employees to wear a uniform that is made from a camouflage printed or patterned material. 
 
• Defines a uniform to be “substantially similar” if it “so resembles an official uniform of the 
United States Armed Forces or state active militia as to cause an ordinary reasonable person to 
believe that the person wearing the uniform is a member of the United States Armed Forces or 
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state active militia.” Provides that a uniform shall not be deemed to be substantially similar to a 
uniform of the United States Armed Forces or state active militia if it includes at least two of the 
following three components: a badge or star or facsimile thereof mounted on the chest area, a 
patch on one or both sleeves displaying the insignia of the employing agency or entity, and the 
word “Police” or “Sheriff” prominently displayed across the back or chest area of the uniform. 
 
• Provides that these restrictions apply to personnel who are assigned to uniformed patrol, 
uniformed crime suppression, or uniformed duty at an event or disturbance, including any 
personnel that respond to assist at a protest, demonstration, or similar disturbance. States that it 
does not apply to members of a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team, sniper team, or 
tactical team engaged in a tactical response or operation. 
 






POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
 
 
AB 2147 (Reyes) – Convictions:  expungement:  inmate hand crews 
 
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), in cooperation with the 
California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) and the Los Angeles County 
Fire Department (LAC FIRE), jointly operates 43 conservation camps, commonly known as fire 
camps, located in 27 counties. All camps are minimum-security facilities and all are staffed with 
correctional staff. 
 
Overall, there are approximately 3,100 inmates working at fire camps currently. All inmates 
receive the same entry-level training that CAL FIRE’s seasonal firefighters receive in addition to 
ongoing training from CAL FIRE throughout the time they are in the program. An inmate must 
volunteer for the fire camp program; no one is involuntarily assigned to work in a fire camp. 
Volunteers must have “minimum custody” status, or the lowest classification for inmates based 
on their sustained good behavior in prison, their conforming to rules within the prison and 
participation in rehabilitative programming. 
 
Existing law provides procedures in which a person who has been arrested for, or convicted of, a 
criminal offense, can petition a court to have his or her conviction dismissed or “expunged.”  
Under existing law, an expungement does not relieve a person of the duty to disclose such a 
conviction when seeking licensing by the state. California has a large number of professions 
which require an individual to be licensed in order to engage in those activities. Inmate 
firefighters can have difficulty getting an EMT license because of their prior convictions.  
Without an EMT license, these same individuals can be excluded from jobs with firefighting 
organizations. 
  
AB 2147 (Reyes), Chapter 60, allows a defendant who successfully participated in Fire 
Camp, as specified, to petition for a dismissal of their conviction, releasing the defendant 
from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense, except as provided. A defendant 
granted this dismissal shall not be required to disclose the conviction on an application for 
licensure by any state or local agency, with certain exceptions. Specifically, this new law: 
• Provides that a defendant who has successfully participated in a Fire Camp, as 
determined by the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 
(CDCR), or successfully participated as a member of a county incarcerated individual 
hand crew, as determined by the appropriate county authority, and has been released from 
custody, the defendant is eligible for expungement relief, except that incarcerated 
individuals who have been convicted of specified serious crimes. 
• Specifies that to be eligible for relief, the defendant is not required to complete the term 
of their probation, parole, or supervised release. 
93 
 
• States that expungement relief is available for all convictions for which the defendant is 
serving a sentence at the time the defendant successfully participates in one of the 
required programs. 
• Provides that if all of the requirements are met, the court, in its discretion and in the 
interest of justice, may dismiss the accusations or information against the defendant and 
the defendant shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from 
the offense of which the defendant has been convicted, except as specified. 
• Specifies that a defendant who is granted expungement shall not be required to disclose 
the conviction on an application for licensure by any state or local agency, except in an 
application for licensure by the Commission on Teacher Credentialing, a position as a 




AB 2512 (Stone, M.) – Death Penalty: person with an intellectual disability 
 
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court ruled that it is unconstitutional to execute someone 
with an intellectual disability. (Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536 U.S. 304, 321 (Atkins).) The Court 
left it up to the states to “‘develop[] appropriate ways’” to ensure that intellectually disabled 
defendants are not sentenced to death. (Id. at p. 317, quoting Ford v. Wainwright (1986) 477 
U.S. 399, 416-417.) The following year, the Legislature added Penal Code section 1376 to 
implement this decision. The intellectual disability standard set forth in the statute was derived 
from the two clinical definitions referenced by the Court in Atkins. (In re Hawthorne (2005) 35 
Cal.4th 40, 44, 47-48.) Unfortunately, despite the fact that clinical standards have changed over 
the years, the statute has not been updated.  
 
Regarding post-conviction relief, California Supreme Court guidance provides that a claim of 
intellectual disability should be raised by a petition for writ of habeas corpus. By its terms, the 
standards and procedures set forth in Penal Code section 1376 apply only to pre-conviction 
proceedings. However, our state High Court has concluded that post-conviction proceedings 
should “track[] section 1376 as closely as logic and practicality permit….” (In re Hawthorne, 
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 47.) 
 
AB 2512 (Stone), Chapter 331, authorizes a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of 
death to apply for an order directing that a hearing to determine intellectual disability be 
conducted as part of a habeas corpus petition and revises the definition of intellectual 
disability. Specifically, this new law:   
 
• States that the United States Supreme Court has recognized that it is unconstitutional 
to execute a person with an intellectual disability. It is the intent of the Legislature 
that California adopt the professional medical community’s definition and 
understanding of intellectual disability. It is the further intent of the Legislature that 
individuals with intellectual disabilities be accurately and quickly identified to avoid 
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protracted and unnecessary litigation. 
 
• Revises the definition of "intellectual disability" to mean the condition of 
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with 
deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested before the end of the developmental 
period, as defined by clinical standards. 
 
• Defines "prima facie showing of intellectual disability" to mean that the defendant's 
allegation of intellectual disability is based on the type of evidence typically relied on 
by a qualified expert in diagnosing intellectual disability, as defined in current clinical 
standards, or when a qualified expert provides a declaration diagnosing the defendant 
as intellectually disabled. 
 
• Requires the court to order a hearing to determine whether the defendant is a person 
with an intellectual disability upon a prima facie showing, as defined. 
 
• Authorizes a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of death to apply for an order 
directing that a hearing to determine intellectual disability be conducted as part of a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  
 
• Provides that when the claim of intellectual disability is raised in a petition for habeas 
corpus and a petitioner makes a prima facie showing of intellectual disability, the 
reviewing court shall issue an order to show cause if the petitioner has met the prima 
facie standard.  
 
• Specifies that the petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the petitioner is a person with an intellectual disability.  
 
• Provides that the state may present its case regarding the issue of whether the 
petitioner is a person with an intellectual disability. Each party may offer rebuttal 
evidence. 
 
• Provides that during an evidentiary hearing under the habeas corpus provisions, an 
expert may testify about the contents of out-of-court statements, including 
documentary evidence and statements from witnesses when those types of statements 
are accepted by the medical community as relevant to a diagnosis of intellectual 
disability if the expert relied upon these statements as the basis for their opinion.  
 
• Prohibits changing or adjusting the results of a test measuring intellectual functioning 









AB 2542 (Kalra) – Criminal procedure:  discrimination 
 
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court issued a landmark ruling on the issue of racial bias and 
prejudice in the American Court System – McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) 481 U.S. 279 
(McCleskey). The McCleskey opinion has had far-reaching effects on a wide array of equal 
protection claims. “The precedent impairs constitutional challenges based on widespread racial 
disparities not just in capital sentencing, but in the criminal-justice system more widely; it 
requires defendants to prove discrimination on a specific basis, providing clear evidence that 
they were explicitly targeted because of their race. If police officers, prosecutors, judges, or 
others don’t openly acknowledge their own prejudices, defendants face a prohibitively high bar 
fighting for their Fourteenth Amendment rights in court.” (Neklason, The “Death Penalty’s Dred 
Scott” Lives on, The Atlantic (June 14, 2019).) 
 
AB 2542 (Kalra), Chapter 317, prohibits the state from seeking or obtaining a 
conviction or sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin. Specifically, this 
new law:   
 
• Prohibits the state from seeking or obtaining a criminal conviction or seeking, 
obtaining, or imposing a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.  
• Applies prospectively in cases in which a judgment has not been entered prior to January 1, 
2021. 
• States that a violation of this prohibition is established if the defendant proves, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, any of the following: 
o The judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the 
case, an expert witness, or juror exhibited bias or animus towards the 
defendant because of the defendant's race, ethnicity, or national origin; 
o During the defendant’s trial, in court and during the proceedings, the judge, an 
attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert 
witness, or juror, used racially discriminatory language about the defendant's 
race, ethnicity, or national origin, except as specified, or otherwise exhibited 
bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant's race, 
ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful; 
o The defendant was charged or convicted of a more serious offense than 
defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins who commit similar 
offenses and are similarly situated and the evidence establishes that the 
prosecution more frequently sought or obtained convictions for more serious 
offenses against people who share the defendant's race, ethnicity, or national 
origin in the county where the convictions were sought or obtained; 
o A longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was 
imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense, 
and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for that 
offense on people that share the defendant's race, ethnicity, or national origin 
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than on defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins in the county 
where the sentence was imposed; or, 
o A longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was 
imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense, 
and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for the 
same offense on defendants in cases with victims of one race, ethnicity, or 
national origin than in cases with victims of other races, ethnicities, or 
national origins in the county where the sentence was imposed. 
• States that a defendant may file a motion in the trial court, or if judgement has been 
imposed, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate the 
conviction or sentence in a court of competent jurisdiction alleging a violation of the 
prohibition. 
• States that if a motion is filed in the trial court and the defendant makes a prima facie 
showing of a violation, the court shall hold a hearing. 
• Provides that at the hearing, evidence may be presented by either party, including but 
not limited to, statistical evidence, aggregate data, expert testimony, and the sworn 
testimony of witnesses. The court may also appoint an independent expert. 
• States that the defendant shall have the burden of proving the violation by a 
preponderance of the evidence and at the conclusion of the hearing, the court shall 
make findings on the record. 
• Provides that a defendant may file a motion requesting disclosure of all evidence 
relevant to a potential violation of the prohibition that is in the possession or control 
of the state. Upon a showing of good cause, and if the records are not privileged, the 
court shall order the records to be released. Upon a showing of good cause, the court 
may permit the prosecution to redact information prior to disclosure. 
• States that, notwithstanding any other law, except for an initiative approved by the 
voters, if the court finds by a preponderance of evidence a violation of the 
prohibition, the court shall impose a remedy specific to the violation found from the 
following list of remedies: 
o Before a judgment has been entered, the court may reseat a juror removed by 
use of a peremptory challenge, declare a mistrial if requested by the 
defendant, discharge the jury panel and empanel a new jury, or, in the interests 
of justice, the court may dismiss enhancements, special circumstances, or 
special allegations, or reduce one or more charges; 
o When judgment has been entered: 
§ If the court finds that the conviction was sought or obtained in 
violation of the prohibition, the court shall vacate the conviction and 
sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings;  
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§ If the court finds the violation was based only on the defendant being 
charged or convicted of a more serious offense than defendants of 
other races, ethnicities, or national origins, and the court has the ability 
to rectify the violation by modifying the judgment, the court shall 
vacate the judgment and sentence, find that the conviction is legally 
invalid, and modify the judgment to impose an appropriate remedy for 
the violation that occurred, except that the court shall not impose a 
sentence greater than that previously imposed; and, 
§ If the court finds that only the sentence was sought, obtained, or 
imposed in violation of the prohibition, the court shall vacate the 
sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and impose a new sentence no 
greater than the sentence previously imposed. 
• Prohibits imposition of the death penalty where the court finds a violation of the 
prohibition.  
• Provides that the remedies available under this provision do not foreclose any other 
remedies available under the United States Constitution, the California Constitution, 
or any other law. 
• Specifies that these provisions apply to adjudications and dispositions in the juvenile 
delinquency system. 
• Provides that these provisions do not prevent the prosecution of hate crimes. 
• Defines "more frequently sought or obtained" or "more frequently imposed" as 
meaning that statistical evidence or aggregate data demonstrate a significant 
difference in seeking or obtaining convictions or in imposing sentences comparing 
individuals who have committed similar offenses and are similarly situated and the 
prosecution cannot establish race-neutral reasons for the disparity. 
• Defines "prima facie showing" as meaning that the defendant produces facts that, if 
true, establish a substantial likelihood that a violation of the prohibition occurred. 
“Substantial likelihood” requires more than a mere possibility, but less than a 
standard of more likely than not.  
• Defines "racially discriminatory language" as meaning language that, to an objective 
observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias, including, but not limited to, 
racially charged or racially coded language, language that compares the defendant to 
an animal, or language that references the defendant's physical appearance, culture, 
ethnicity or national origin. Evidence that particular words or images are used 
exclusively or disproportionately in cases where the defendant is of a specific race, 
ethnicity, or national origin is relevant to determining whether language is 
discriminatory. 




• Provides that a defendant may share a race, ethnicity, or national origin with more 
than one group and may aggregate data among groups to demonstrate a violation of 
the prohibition. 
• Specifies that a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted after a judgment has been 
entered based on evidence of a violation of the prohibition if the judgment was 
entered on or after January 1, 2021. 
• States that a petition raising such a claim for the first time, or on the basis of new 
discovery provided by the state or other new evidence that could not have been 
previously known by the petitioner with due diligence, shall not be deemed a 
successive or abusive petition. 
• Provides that if a petitioner already has a habeas corpus petition pending in state 
court, but it has not yet been decided, the petitioner may amend the existing petition 
with a claim of a violation of the prohibition. 
• Requires the petition to state if the petitioner requests appointment of counsel and the 
court to appoint counsel if the petitioner cannot afford counsel and either the petition 
alleges facts that would establish a violation of the prohibition or the State Public 
Defender requests counsel be appointed. Newly appointed counsel may amend a 
petition filed before their appointment. 
• Requires the court to review the petition and if the court determines the petitioner has 
made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the court shall issue an order to 
show cause why relief shall not be granted and hold an evidentiary hearing, unless the 
state declines to show cause.  
• Provides that the defendant shall appear at the hearing by video unless counsel 
indicates that their presence is needed. 
• States that if the court determines that the petitioner has not established a prima facie 
showing of entitlement to relief, the court shall state the factual and legal basis for its 
conclusion on the record or issue a written order detailing the factual and legal basis 
for its conclusion. 
 
• Makes conforming changes to allow a person who is no longer in custody to vacate a 
conviction or sentence based on a violation of the prohibition. 
 
• Contains a severability clause. 
 
• Makes a number of Legislative findings and declarations including that it is the intent 
of the Legislature to eliminate racial bias from California's criminal justice system 
because racism in any form or amount, at any stage of a criminal trial, is intolerable, 
inimical to a fair criminal justice system, is a miscarriage of justice under Article VI 









SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
 
 
AB 904 (Chau) – Search Warrants: Tracking Device 
 
Existing state law has established that for a law enforcement agency to utilize a physical tracking 
device to track a person’s movements, the agency must obtain a tracking device search warrant 
first. This statutory law in California stems from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence from the 
United States Supreme Court which held that a search utilizing a tracking device was 
unreasonable without a warrant. Since California codified the Supreme Court’s actions with 
respect to tracking devices, technology has advanced to permit the tracking of a person’s 
movement through many different means, including by utilizing a person’s cell phone or other 
device that provides GPS locations to a third party company. Supreme Court jurisprudence has 
also begun to address these more technologically advanced mechanisms for searching and 
seizing a person’s data. For example, the Court recognizes that the search of a cell phone is such 
a broad invasion of someone’s personal life that a warrant is required to search one. 
 
In 2015, the California legislature passed the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
to again codify Fourth Amendment principles with respect to advanced technology. The law 
regulates the disclosure of a person’s electronic information by a third party, mandating a 
warrant in most cases for information to be turned over to law enforcement officials. 
 
However, there are ways to access a person’s data without the involvement of a third party, 
namely through “hacking” a device. This may be accomplished by using software that gains 
access to a person’s information secretly. It appears existing California law did not overtly 
address this issue of tracking a person’s movements through means of software. As such, it was 
unclear whether a law enforcement agency utilizing software to track a person's movements, 
whether in conjunction with a third party or by interacting directly with a person's electronic 
device, would be required to obtain a tracking device search warrant first. 
 
AB 904 (Chau), Chapter 63, specifies that a tracking device includes any software that 
permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object. Specifically, this new law 
states that nothing in this new law shall be construed to authorize the use of any device or 
software for the purpose of tracking the movement of a person or object. 
 
 
AB 2655 (Gipson) – Invasion of privacy: first responders 
 
Existing laws severely limit a government entity’s right and ability to share photos of deceased 
persons. For example, coroner’s photos are not disclosable except in limited cases. When a 
government entity takes possession of these sensitive records, it has a duty to take care not to 
disseminate them in a way that violates the expectation of privacy a family has in ensuring their 
loved ones’ gruesome death photos are not shared, lacking a legitimate public interest in the 




However, recent events in California have shown that some government employees have acted 
with impunity in capturing and sharing tragic photos in a salacious manner. A few days after the 
helicopter crash that killed Kobe Bryant and eight others, the Los Angeles Times reported that a 
Los Angeles County sheriff’s deputy was showing gruesome photos taken at the scene of the 
accident to people in a bar. The Sheriff’s Department later determined that eight officers were 
ultimately involved in taking or obtaining photos from the scene without having a law 
enforcement purpose for doing so. These photos were only obtained by individuals by virtue of 
their employment as first responders to an accident scene. 
 
First responders like police and coroners have special access to the scenes of accidents and other 
deadly incidents by virtue of their public employment. While these employees have many 
legitimate reasons to capture images of a scene, the act of obtaining these photos for purely 
personal purposes is improper.  
 
AB 2655 (Gipson), Chapter 219, makes it a misdemeanor for a first responder, as defined, 
operating under color of authority, to use an electronic at the scene of an accident or crime to 
capture the image of a deceased person for any purpose other than an official law 
enforcement purpose or for a genuine public interest. Specifically, this new law: 
• Requires an agency that employs first responders on January 1, 2021 to notify its 
employees who are first responders of the prohibition imposed by this new law. 
 
• Makes it a crime for a first responder, operating under color of authority, who responds to 
the scene of an accident or crime to capture the photographic image of a deceased person 
by any means, including, but not limited to, by use of a personal electronic device or a 
device belonging to their employing agency, for any purpose other than an official law 
enforcement purpose or a genuine public interest is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable 
by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) per violation. 
 
• Creates the right to obtain a warrant when the property or things to be seized consists of 
evidence that tends to show that a violation of this new law has occurred or is occurring. 
Provides that evidence to be seized pursuant to this new law shall be limited to evidence 
of a violation of the prohibitions imposed by this new law and shall not include evidence 
of a violation of a departmental rule or guideline that is not a public offense under 
California law. 
 
• Defines, for purposes of this new law, “first responder” to mean a state or local peace 
officer, paramedic, emergency medical technician, rescue service personnel, emergency 







SB 145 (Weiner) – Sex Offenders: Registration 
   
In 1947, California became the first state in the nation to require sex offender registration for 
persons convicted of specified offenses. Sex offender registration is a regulatory means of 
assisting law enforcement in dealing with the problem of recidivist sex offenders. Until recently, 
California was one of the few states that required lifetime registration for all registerable offenses 
with no discernment for the type of offense or the characteristics of the offender.   
 
California law criminalizes the act of statutory rape, meaning that if a young person has 
voluntary sexual intercourse with a minor that person is guilty of a crime. Such an offense does 
not automatically require sex offender registration if the perpetrator is within 10 years of age of 
the minor and the minor is 14 years or older. In these so-called “Romeo and Juliet” cases, the 
court has discretion, based on the facts of the case, to decide whether or not to place the 
defendant on the sex offender registry. On the other hand, if the sex act performed is oral or anal 
sex, then the court must always place the defendant on the sex offender registry, regardless of the 
facts of the case. In other words, if a 19-year-old man is convicted of having sex with his 17-
year-old boyfriend, he must register as a sex offender. That may not be the case, however, for a 
24-year-old man who has vaginal intercourse with a 15-year-old girl. Such a person can avoid 
sex offender registration if a judge decides it’s unnecessary.   
 
Some believe that this disparate treatment of sexual acts originates from laws that criminalized 
“gay” sex until the 1970s. Stakeholders have pointed out that the distinction in the law is 
irrational and discriminatory towards LGBTQ youth as it treats oral and anal sex as a more 
egregious crime than penile-vaginal sex, with the former mandating sex offender registration, but 
giving discretion to the courts for the latter. This subject has been hotly contested in the courts 
and the California Supreme Court has addressed the issue at least twice in recent years.   
 
SB 145 (Wiener), Chapter 79, provides that defendants convicted of the specified, non-
forcible sex offenses involving minors (described above) from mandatory registration as 
a sex offender. Specifically, this new law:   
 
• Exempts a person convicted of non-forcible sodomy with a minor, oral copulation 
with a minor, or sexual penetration with a minor, as specified, from having to 
automatically register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registry Act if the 
person was not more than ten years older than the minor at the time of the offense, 
and the conviction only requires one person to register.   
 
• Specifies that a person convicted of one of those specified offenses may still be 
ordered to register in the discretion of the court, if the court finds at the time of 
conviction or sentencing that the person committed the offense as a result of sexual 








AB 1950 (Kamlager) – Probation: length of term 
 
California’s adult supervised probation population is around 548,000 – the largest of any state in 
the nation, more than twice the size of the state’s prison population, almost four times larger than 
its jail population and about six times larger than its parole population. 
 
A paper called Paradox of Probation: Community Supervision in the Age of Mass Incarceration 
discussed concerns that more and higher levels of probation supervision can lead increased 
involvement in the criminal justice system for the individuals being supervised on probation.  
Scholars argue that the enhanced restrictions and monitoring of probation set probationers up to 
fail, with mandatory meetings, home visits, regular drug testing, and program compliance 
incompatible with the instability of probationers’ everyday lives. In addition, the enhanced 
monitoring by probation officers (and in some cases, law enforcement as well) makes the 
detection of minor violations and offenses more likely. 
 
Research by the California Budget & Policy Center shows that probation services, such as 
mental healthcare and addiction treatment, are most effective during the first 18 months of 
supervision. Research also indicates that providing increased supervision and services earlier 
reduces an individual’s likelihood to recidivate. 
AB 1950 (Kamlager), Chapter 328, specifies that a court may not impose a term of 
probation longer than two years for a felony conviction and one year for a misdemeanor 
conviction, except as specified. Specifically, this new law. 
• Limits the probation term to one year for misdemeanor offenses. Does not apply to any 
offense that includes a specific probation term in statute. 
 
• Limits the probation term to two years for a felony offenses. 
 
• Provides that the two-year probation limit does not apply to offenses defined by law as 
violent felonies, or to an offense that includes a specific probation term within its 
provisions.  
 
• Provides that the two-year probation limit does not apply to a felony conviction for grand 
theft from an employer, embezzlement, or theft by false pretenses, if the total value of 
property taken exceeds $25,000.  
 
 
AB 2321 (Jones-Sawyer) – Juvenile court records: access 
 
In 2000, Congress created the U-Visa and T-Visa classifications with its passage of the Victims 
of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (VTVPA). This law affords immigrants who are 
victims of a common or human trafficking crime with the opportunity to obtain an immigrant 
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visa upon cooperation with law enforcement in an investigation of an underlying crime. The 
creation of the U- and T-Visas encourage immigrants to report crimes and receive protection 
from existing criminal laws.  
 
As a part of obtaining a U- or T-visa, a person must get certification by a prosecutor of 
helpfulness. Prosecutors must sign under penalty of perjury that a victim was helpful in a 
qualifying case. Without access to the files for review, prosecutors are unable to refresh their 
recollection or make an initial determination regarding helpfulness.  
 
AB 2321 (Jones-Sawyer), Chapter 137, permits a prosecutor or a court to access sealed 
juvenile records for the limited purpose of certifying victim helpfulness in an application for 
a U-Visa or a T-Visa. Specifically, this new law: 
 
• States that a record that was sealed pursuant to this section that was generated in 
connection with the investigation, prosecution, or adjudication of a qualifying offense as 
defined may be accessed by a judge or prosecutor for the limited purpose of processing a 
request of a victim or victim’s family member to certify victim helpfulness on the Form 
I-918 Supplement B certification or Form I-914 Supplement B declaration. Further states 
that the information obtained shall not be disseminated to other agencies or individuals, 
except as necessary to certify victim helpfulness on the Form I-918 Supplement B 
certification or Form I-914 Supplement B declaration, and under no circumstances shall it 
be used to support the imposition of penalties, detention, or other sanctions upon an 
individual. 
 
• Provides that when a new petition has been filed against the minor in juvenile court and 
the issue of competency is raised, by the probation department, the prosecuting attorney, 
counsel for the minor, and the court for the purpose of assessing the minor’s competency 
in the proceedings on the new petition. Further states that access, inspection, or utilization 
of the sealed records is limited to any prior competency evaluations submitted to the 
court, whether ordered by the court or not, all reports concerning remediation efforts and 
success, all court findings and orders relating to the minor’s competency, and any other 
evidence submitted to the court for consideration in determining the minor’s competency, 
including, but not limited to, school records and other test results. States that the 
information obtained pursuant to this subparagraph shall not be disseminated to any other 
person or agency except as necessary to evaluate the minor’s competency or provide 
remediation services, and shall not be used to support the imposition of penalties, 
detention, or other sanctions on the minor. Also provides that access to the sealed record 
under this subparagraph shall not be construed as a modification of the court’s order 
dismissing the petition and sealing the record in the case. 
 
 
AB 2426 (Reyes) – Victims of crime 
 
In 2000, Congress created the U and T-Visa classifications with its passage of the Victims of 
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (VTVPA). This law affords immigrants who are victims 
of a common or human trafficking crime with the opportunity to obtain an immigrant visa upon 
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cooperation with law enforcement in an investigation of an underlying crime. The creation of the 
U and T-Visas encourage immigrants to report crimes and receive protection from existing 
criminal laws. However, in many jurisdictions, immigrants experience difficulty and or delays in 
obtaining the proper documentation from law enforcement to certify their participation in the 
investigation. These delays can result directly in the denial of a U-Visa or T-Visa application, 
leaving an eligible immigrant unable to adjust their status and vulnerable to deportation.  
 
AB 2426 (Reyes), Chapter 187, specifies the law enforcement agencies that are required 
to process a victim certification for an immigrant victim of a crime for the purposes of 
obtaining U-Visas and T-Visas. Specifically, this new law: 
• Specifies that a “certifying entity” includes without limitation, the police department 
of the University of California, a California State University campus, or the police 
department of a school district, established pursuant to Section 38000 of the 
Education Code. 
• Provides that a certifying official shall not refuse to complete the Form I-918 Supplement B 
certification or to certify helpfulness because a case has already been prosecuted or otherwise 
closed, or because the time for commencing a criminal action has expired. 
 
• Provides that a certifying official shall not refuse to complete the Form I-914 Supplement B 
certification or to certify helpfulness because a case has already been prosecuted or otherwise 
closed, or because the time for commencing a criminal action has expired. 
 
 
AB 2606 (Cervantes) – Criminal Justice: Supervised Release File 
 
The California Law Enforcement Communications System (CLETS) is set forth in Government 
Code section 15150 et seq. It is “a statewide telecommunications system of communication for 
the use of law enforcement agencies.” (Gov. Code, § 15152.) 
 
Under current law, the Department of Justice (DOJ) in conjunction with the California 
Department of Corrections must update supervised release files on CLETS every 10 days to 
show recent inmates paroled from facilities under its jurisdiction. (Pen. Code, § 14216, subd. 
(a).) The DOJ has a similar duty in conjunction with the Department of State Hospitals (DSH) to 
update these records to show patients undergoing community health treatment and supervision 
through the conditional release program administered by DSH, except as specified. (Pen. Code, § 
14216, subd. (b).) There is no similar requirement to update CLETS with information regarding 
individuals who have been released under county supervision – i.e., persons on probation, 
mandatory supervision, and postrelease community supervision (PRCS). As a result, this 
information is often incomplete and not available to law enforcement. 
 
AB 2606 (Cervantes), Chapter 332, requires each county probation department or other 
supervising county agency to update any supervised release file that is available to them 
on CLETS every 10 days by entering any person placed onto postconviction supervision 
within their jurisdiction and under their authority, including persons on probation, 
mandatory supervision, and PRCS.  
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